AN INSURGENCY in southern Thailand that had almost sputtered out for lack of support could soon be turned into a fierce regional conflict through the callous treatment of the local Muslim population by the Thai army and the insensitive response of the government.

On Oct. 25, 2004, seven Muslims were shot dead during a demonstration outside the police station at Tak Bai, in Narathiwat province. The 3,000 protesters had gathered to demand the release of six villagers who were accused of giving their government-issued guns to separatist militants. Soldiers and police shot at the demonstrators, claiming that they had been fired upon first. After the shooting, over 1,300 men detained on the spot were made to lie down upon the ground. Soldiers then bound the prisoners’ hands, picked them up and threw them into the back of trucks: some say the men were stacked on top of each other in as many as five layers. They then were driven to a military detention center—a journey which lasted a full five hours. The detainees were not supplied with water, and 78 died from suffocation and dehydration.

The first reaction of Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was to support the army and its version of events. The protest had taken place during Ramadan, and Thaksin said of the victims, “This is typical. It’s about bodies made weak from fasting. Nobody hurt them.”

What was typical, however, was Thaksin’s tendency to talk without thinking first. He often reacts to events spontaneously, delivering pronouncements inspired more by his personal prejudices and political preconceptions than by a sober consideration of the facts or of the possible consequences of his words. He plays upon the feelings of a right-wing nationalist element which is out of step with the tolerant and open-minded attitudes of most Thais.

In most countries, nationalists tend to be centralizers and homogenizers: not for them an easy acceptance of diverse cultures, languages and religions beneath one flag. Modern Thai nationalism embraces a sense of Thai identity that is pervaded by concepts and practices derived from Buddhism, the faith of 95 percent of the population. It tends to be selective in what it draws from Buddhism: the more right-wing nationalists have no qualms about advocating violence against enemies, contrary to most understandings of Buddhist teachings.

The nationalist version of Thai history is above all concerned with the core region of modern Thailand, but historically the southernmost provinces often had a closer involvement in the affairs of the adjacent Malay states: the Sultanate of Pattani, which embraced most of the predominantly Muslim region, was only incorporated into Thailand in 1902.

There was an outcry against the army’s behavior in the Tak Bai incident, and Thaksin’s response, from many quarters, including liberal senators, much of the print media, and human rights workers. The Nation newspaper reported that a forum of Buddhist, Muslim and Christian religious leaders warned against using innocent Muslims as scapegoats for the problems of the south. Particularly significant was the attitude taken by King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who rarely intervenes in political issues, but whom most Thais regard with great respect. Emerging from an audience with the king, Thaksin told reporters, “He expressed his concern over the situation in the south and he asked the government to consider being more lenient in dealing with the problem and to allow locals to participate in problem-solving.” The government, he said, was “humbly taking the advice of His Majesty the King...”

A panel, including three Muslim scholars, has been appointed to investigate what occurred.

The Tak Bai incident follows an earlier episode of military violence on April 28, when 107 Muslims were killed, 32 of them when the army stormed a mosque said to be occupied by militants (see the September 2004 Washington Report, p. 43). The Thaksin government made no serious attempt to bring the army to heel then, or to remedy the grievances of the poor and long-neglected south, beyond the repeating of oft-heard promises of more development spending. It now hangs in the balance whether the polarization upon which right-wing Thai nationalists and extremist elements in the Muslim areas thrive can be halted and reversed—but it seems that Thaksin is part of the problem, not the solution.

If the worst does happen, and Thailand’s south lapses more deeply into conflict, there no doubt will be a spate of pronouncements from the usual suspects in the West about the clash of civilizations and Muslim intolerance toward non-Muslims. That’s ideologically more satisfying than giving thought to how human beings of any culture or religion might respond to being shot at, trussed up, buried beneath a pile of other people in the back of a truck for a few hours and then themselves blamed for how they were treated.

Yasser Arafat Honored

One of the few heads of state from outside the Arab world to attend Yasser Arafat’s funeral in Cairo was Indonesia’s recently elected president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi was also there. The presence of the leading political figures of these two Muslim-majority Southeast Asian countries was regarded at home both as a gesture of respect for Arafat, and of support for the Palestinian cause.

Tributes to the Palestinian leader were many. Andi Malaranggeng, spokesman for the Indonesian president, called Arafat “a man who was also close to the hearts of the Indonesian people.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Marty Natalegawa described Arafat as a “hero to us all,” saying, “He was the ultimate embodiment of decades of the just struggle of a nation for its undeniable rights to self-determination.” The Malaysian prime minister, currently chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, said, “That Arafat’s death is a great loss to the Palestinians and the cause of Palestine would be an understatement.”

Chinese President Hu Jintao sent a message of condolence to the acting president of the Palestinian National Authority, Rawhi Fattuh, in which he praised Arafat as “an outstanding leader of the Palestinian cause” and referred to his role in establishing friendly relations between China and the Palestinians. Although Arafat’s first official visit to Beijing only took place in 1977, following over a decade of open Sino-Palestinian ties, he is reported to have made an unofficial visit to China on a false passport in March 1964, when he represented Al-Fatah, under the name of “Mohammed Rifaat.” Hu described Arafat as an outstanding politician who had dedicated his whole life to the just cause of regaining the lawful right of the Palestinian people.

The other countries of the region all issued statements of regret at the Palestinian leader’s passing. Singaporean President S.R. Nathan’s message of condolence read: “President Arafat was the leader of the Palestinian people for over a generation and symbolized the struggles of the Palestinian people for an independent statehood.”

John Gee is a free-lance journalist based in Singapore, and the author of Unequal Conflict: the Palestinians and Israel, available from the AET Book Club.
 

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 2005, pages 36, 76
Islam and the Near East in the Far East      http://www.wrmea.com/archives/Jan_Feb_2005/0501036.html

 By John Gee