An enclave is part of a country geographically
separated from the main part by the surrounding foreign territory. A
great deal of works has been done by the military’s civilian
collaborators on the province of Arakan (Rakhine province) claiming that
there is the existence of an enclave in Burma. Most prominent of the
authors is Aye Chan. Aye Chan, a native of Burma’s Arakan (Rakhine)
province, says there is an enclave in Arakan. (1) His work even outlines
the common issues of dispute surrounding the Rohingyas with the Rakhines.
This doesn’t seem to be an ordinary enclave. This enclave is Aye Chan’s
portrayal of Burma’s Rohingya people in the Mayu frontier of the Arakan
state. Aye Chan identifies the Rohingyas as thenon-natives of Burma who,
he claims, illegally settled in this region of Burma’s North-Western
province. This paper is a detailed review of the claims.
Click to read more
racism-to-Rohingya-in-Burma-by-Dr-Abid-Bahar-in-response-to-Aye-Chans-Enclave-With-Influx-Viruses.PDF
Asia’s new boat people Burma’s
displaced people
Thousands of stateless Rohingyas are
leaving Burma and Bangladesh, dreaming of a better life in
Malaysia.Click to read moreBy
Chris Lewa.PDF
The Rohingya minority:
Exclusion and discrimination
The Muslim population of northern
Rakhine State, known as Rohingya2, constitutes an
ethnic, linguistic and religious minority group. Their
number is estimated at 725,000 or about 80% of the total
population of that area (UNHCR). They are ethnically
related to the Chittagonian Bengalis just across the
border in Bangladesh. Of South Asian descent, they
profess Sunni Islam and their language is close to the
Chittagonian vernacular.Click to read moreCEDAW_Myanmar_AP_Submission-Final-Web
by chris lewa.pdf
Northern
Arakan State is one of the main pockets of acute poverty
and vulnerability in Burma.
Northern Arakan State
is one of the main pockets of acute poverty and
vulnerability in Burma. This region, adjacent to the
border with Bangladesh, experiences what many refer
to as a “chronic emergency” and there is an absolute
consensus among the local population as well as
humanitarian actors that international aid is,
despite its limited impact, essential to avert a new
mass outflow of refugees to Bangladesh.Click
to read moreNorthern
Arakan State is one of the main pockets of acute
poverty and vulnerability in Burma.pdf
North Arakan: An open prison for
the Rohingya in Burma
by Chris Lewa
(Wednesday, April 15, 2009)
“Many minorities, including the Rohingya of
Burma, are persecuted by being rendered stateless.”
Hundreds of thousands have fled to
Bangladesh and further afield to escape oppression or in order
to survive. There were mass exoduses to Bangladesh in 1978 and
again in 1991-92. Each time, international pressure persuaded
Burma to accept them back and repatriation followed, often under
coercion. But the outflow continues.
The Rohingya are an ethnic, linguistic and
religious minority group mainly concentrated in North Arakan (or
‘Rakhine’) State in Burma, adjacent to Bangladesh, where their
number is estimated at 725,000. Of South Asian descent, they are
related to the Chittagonian Bengalis just across the border in
Bangladesh, whose language is also related. They profess Sunni
Islam and are distinct from the majority Burmese population who
are of East Asian stock and mostly Buddhists. Since Burma’s
independence in 1948, the Rohingya have gradually been excluded
from the process of nation-building.
The 1982 Citizenship Law
In 1982, Burma’s military rulers brought in
a new Citizenship Law [1] which deprived most people of Indian
and Chinese descent of citizenship. However, the timing of its
promulgation, shortly after the refugee repatriation of 1979,
strongly suggests that it was specifically designed to exclude
the Rohingya. Unlike the preceding 1948 Citizenship Act, the
1982 Law is essentially based on the principle of jus sanguinis
and identifies three categories of citizens: full, associate and
naturalised.
Full citizens are those belonging to one of
135 ‘national races’[2] settled in Burma before 1823, the start
of the British colonisation of Arakan. The Rohingyas do not
appear in this list and the government does not recognise the
term ‘Rohingya’. Associate citizenship was only granted to those
whose application for citizenship under the 1948 Act was pending
on the date the Act came into force. Naturalised citizenship
could only be granted to those who could furnish “conclusive
evidence” of entry and residence before Burma’s independence on
4 January 1948, who could speak one of the national languages
well and whose children were born in Burma. Very few Rohingyas
could fulfil these requirements. Moreover, the wide powers
assigned to a government-controlled ‘Central Body’ to decide on
matters pertaining to citizenship mean that, in practice, the
Rohingyas’ entitlement to citizenship will not be recognised.
In 1989, colour-coded Citizens Scrutiny
Cards (CRCs) were introduced: pink cards for full citizens, blue
for associate citizens and green for naturalised citizens. The
Rohingya were not issued with any cards. In 1995, in response to
UNHCR’s intensive advocacy efforts to document the Rohingyas,
the Burmese authorities started issuing them with a Temporary
Registration Card (TRC), a white card, pursuant to the 1949
Residents of Burma Registration Act. The TRC does not mention
the bearer’s place of birth and cannot be used to claim
citizenship. The family list, which every family residing in
Burma possesses, only records family members and their date of
birth. It does not indicate the place of birth and therefore
provides no official evidence of birth in Burma – and so
perpetuates their statelessness.
The Rohingya are recognised neither as
citizens nor as foreigners. The Burmese government also objects
to them being described as stateless persons but appears to have
created a special category: ‘Myanmar residents’, which is not a
legal status. However, on more than one occasion, government
officials have described them as ‘illegal immigrants from
Bangladesh’. In 1998, in a letter to UNHCR, Burma’s then Prime
Minister General Khin Nyunt wrote: “These people are not
originally from Myanmar but have illegally migrated to Myanmar
because of population pressures in their own country.” And a
February 2009 article in the government-owned New Light of
Myanmar newspaper stated that “In Myanmar there is no national
race by the name of Rohinja.”
Deprivation of citizenship has served as a
key strategy to justify arbitrary treatment and discriminatory
policies against the Rohingya. Severe restrictions on their
movements are increasingly applied. They are banned from
employment in the civil service, including in the education and
health sectors. In 1994, the authorities stopped issuing
Rohingya children with birth certificates. By the late 1990s,
official marriage authorisations were made mandatory.
Infringement of these stringent rules can result in long prison
sentences. Other coercive measures such as forced labour,
arbitrary taxation and confiscation of land, also practised
elsewhere in Burma, are imposed on the Rohingya population in a
disproportionate manner.
Restrictions of movement
The Rohingyas are virtually confined to
their village tracts. They need to apply for a travel pass even
to visit a neighbouring village – and they have to pay for the
pass. Travel is strictly restricted to North Arakan. Even Sittwe,
the state capital, has been declared off-limits for them. Their
lack of mobility has devastating consequences, limiting their
access to markets, employment opportunities, health facilities
and higher education. Those who overstay the time allowed by
their travel pass are prevented from returning to their village
as their names are deleted from their family list. They are then
obliterated administratively and compelled to leave Burma. Some
Rohingyas have been prosecuted under national security
legislation for travelling without permission.
Rohingyas are also forbidden to travel to
Bangladesh, although in practice obtaining a travel pass to a
border village and then crossing clandestinely into Bangladesh
has proved easier than reaching Sittwe. But, similarly, those
caught doing so could face a jail sentence there for illegal
entry. Many people, including patients seeking medical treatment
in Bangladesh, were unable to return home when, during their
absence, their names were cancelled on their family list. Once
outside Burma, Rohingyas are systematically denied the right to
return to their country.
Marriage authorisations
In the late 1990s, a local order was issued
in North Arakan, applying exclusively to the Muslim population,
requiring couples planning to marry to obtain official
permission from the local authorities – usually the NaSaKa,
Burma’s Border Security Force. Marriage authorisations are
granted on the payment of fees and bribes and can take up to
several years to obtain. This is beyond the means of the
poorest. This local order also prohibits any cohabitation or
sexual contact outside wedlock. It is not backed by any domestic
legislation but breaching it can lead to prosecution, punishable
by up to 10 years’ imprisonment.
In 2005, as the NaSaKa was reshuffled
following the ousting of General Khin Nyunt, marriage
authorisations were completely suspended for several months.
When they restarted issuing them in late 2005, additional
conditions were attached including the stipulation that couples
have to sign an undertaking not to have more than two children.
The amount of bribes and time involved in securing a marriage
permit keeps increasing year after year.
The consequences have been dramatic,
particularly on women. Rohingya women who become pregnant
without official marriage authorisation often resort to
backstreet abortions, an illegal practice in Burma, which has
resulted in many maternal deaths. Others register their newborn
child with another legally married couple, sometimes their own
parents. Some deliver the baby secretly in Bangladesh and
abandon their baby there. Many children are reportedly
unregistered. Many young couples, unable to obtain permission to
marry, flee to Bangladesh in order to live together.
Education and health care
As non-citizens, the Rohingya are excluded
from government employment in health and education and those
public services are appallingly neglected in North Arakan.
Schools and clinics are mostly attended by Rakhine or Burmese
staff who are unable to communicate in the local language and
who often treat Rohingyas with contempt. International
humanitarian agencies are not allowed to train Muslim health
workers, not even auxiliary midwives. Some Rohingya teach in
government schools, paid with rice-paddy under a food-for-work
programme as they cannot hold an official, remunerated teacher’s
post. Restrictions of movement have a serious impact on access
to health and education. Even in emergencies, Rohingyas must
apply for travel permission to reach the poorly equipped local
hospital. Access to better medical facilities in Sittwe hospital
is denied. Referral of critically ill patients is practically
impossible. Consequently, patients who can afford it have sought
medical treatment in Bangladesh but are sometimes unable to
return to their village. Likewise, there are few secondary
schools in North Arakan and pupils need travel permission to
study outside their village. The only university is in Sittwe.
After 2001, most students could no longer attend classes and had
to rely on distance learning, only being allowed to travel to
Sittwe to sit examinations. Since 2005, however, even that has
been prohibited. Not surprisingly, illiteracy among the
Rohingyas is high, estimated at 80%. For the Rohingya, the
compounded effect of these various forms of persecution has
driven many into dire poverty and their degrading conditions
have caused mental distress, pushing them to flee across the
border to Bangladesh.
In exile
In Bangladesh, the 28,000 Rohingyas still
remaining in two camps are recognised as refugees and benefit
from limited protection and assistance by UNHCR but it is
estimated that up to 200,000 more live outside the camps.
Bangladesh considers them as irregular migrants and they have no
access to official protection.
The combination of their lack of status in
Bangladesh and their statelessness in Burma puts them at risk of
indefinite detention. Several hundred Rohingyas are currently
languishing in Bangladeshi jails arrested for illegal entry.
Most are still awaiting trial, sometimes for years. Dozens have
completed their sentences but remain in jail – called ‘released
prisoners’ – as they cannot be officially released and deported,
since Burma refuses to re-admit them.[3]
Tens of thousands of Rohingyas have sought
out opportunities overseas, in the Middle East and increasingly
in Malaysia, using Bangladesh as a transit country. Stateless
and undocumented, they have no other option than relying on
unsafe illegal migration channels, falling prey to unscrupulous
smugglers and traffickers, or undertaking risky journeys on
boats.[4]
In Malaysia or Thailand, the Rohingyas have
no access to protection. They are regularly caught in
immigration crackdowns and end up in the revolving door of
‘informal’ deportations. Since Burma would not take them back,
Thailand has occasionally deported Rohingya boat people
unofficially into border areas of Burma controlled by insurgent
groups. Malaysia usually deports them over the border into
Thailand in the hands of brokers. Against the payment of a fee,
they are smuggled back into Thailand or Malaysia and those
unable to pay are sold into slavery on fishing boats or
plantations.
In December 2008, Thailand started
implementing a new policy of pushing back Rohingya boat people
to the high seas. In at least three separate incidents, 1,200
boat people were handed over to the Thai military on a deserted
island off the Thai coast and ill-treated before being towed out
to sea on boats without an engine and with little food and
water. After drifting for up to two weeks, three boats were
finally rescued in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India and
two boats in Aceh province of Indonesia. More than 300 boat
people are reportedly missing, believed to have drowned.
The issuing of a TRC to Rohingyas has been
praised as ‘a first step towards citizenship’. On 10 May 2008,
the Rohingya were allowed to vote in the constitutional
referendum but ironically the new Constitution, which was
approved, does not contain any provisions granting them
citizenship rights. There is no political will for the Rohingya
to be accepted as Burmese citizens in the foreseeable future.
Recommendations On 2 April 2007, six UN
Special Rapporteurs put out a joint statement addressing the
Rohingya situation and called upon the Burmese government to:
-
repeal or amend the 1982
Citizenship Law to ensure compliance of its legislation
with the country’s international human rights
obligations, including Article 7 of the Convention of
the Rights of the Child and Article 9 of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women;
-
take urgent measures to eliminate
discriminatory practices against the Muslim minority in
North Rakhine [Arakan] State, and to ensure that no
further discrimination is carried out against persons
belonging to this community.
In addition, Bangladesh, Malaysia and
Thailand should put in place effective mechanisms to allow
Rohingyas access to protection as refugees.
Arakaneses at the”brink of extermination”
Arakanese Muslims are ethnically and culturally
closely related to the Bengali people in the area surrounding
Chittagong, but have lived in Burma for generations.
|
Burma’s
Muslim Rohingya Minority Dwell at the “Brink of
Extermination” |
 |
It is not often you meet someone who tells you that
he is from “a people at the brink of extermination.” But the testimonies
from refugees in a remote corner of southern Bangladesh, on the border
with Burma, justify that assessment. For the Rohingya people, a Muslim
minority in northern Arakan State, western Burma, are a stateless people
whose very identity is denied.All the
people of Burma are suffering at the hands of one of the world’s most
brutal, and illegitimate, military regimes. From time to time Burma’s
crisis hits the headlines, as it did with protests led by Buddhist monks
last September, and Cyclone Nargis in May this year. In between such
events, however, Burma fades from the world’s attention.
If Burma as a whole is under-reported, the
people on its western borders are almost unknown to the world.
Journalists, activists and aid agencies who visit the region tend to
head for the Thailand-Burma border, where access to refugees, displaced
people and democracy groups is greatest.
Few visit Burma’s borders with India, where a
famine is unfolding, or with China, where women are trafficked into
prostitution, and fewer still make it to the Bangladesh border where a
slow, forgotten genocide is taking place.
The Rohingya people are ethnically and culturally
closely related to the Bengali people in the area surrounding
Chittagong, but have lived in Burma for generations. While their precise
history may be debated, there is no doubt that they are not newcomers to
the country. Yet unlike all the other ethnic groups in Burma, which
although severely persecuted by the regime are at least recognised as
citizens, the Rohingyas are regarded as “temporary residents” and denied
full citizenship status. They are required to obtain permission before
marrying, and a permit can take several years to secure. Movement is
severely restricted – Rohingyas must obtain permission to travel even
from one village to another, impeding access to medical care and
education. As ‘non-citizens’, Rohingyas cannot be employed as teachers,
nurses, civil servants or in any public service, and in Rohingya areas
teachers, mostly from the Buddhist Rakhine ethnic group, sometimes fail
to turn up for an entire year, disrupting educational opportunities for
the Rohingyas. Rape and forced labour are widespread, and Rohingyas are
singled out by the authorities for extortion. Soldiers demand money from
them, and when they cannot pay they are arrested and tortured.
On a visit to the Bangladesh-Burma border, I heard
numerous accounts of these violations from Rohingya refugees. And they
were confirmed by three defectors who had escaped from Burma’s military.
The defectors, who had served in the Burma Army’s border security force
known as the ‘Na Sa Ka’, said that the Rohingya were specifically
targeted for extortion. One said: “Throughout my life in the Na Sa Ka, I
was used to this system of arresting Muslims, asking for money,
torturing them, every day. We only arrested Muslims, not Rakhines.”
The Rohingyas face religious persecution as well.
It is almost impossible to obtain permission to renovate, repair,
rebuild or extend mosques or other religious buildings. In the past
three years, 12 mosques in northern Arakan have been demolished, and a
large number were closed in 2006. Since 1962, I was told, not a single
new mosque has been built. Religious leaders have been jailed for
illegally renovating mosques.
A senior UN official, who has served in Darfur,
Somalia and other humanitarian crisis situations and, in the words of a
foreign diplomat, “knows misery when he sees it”, recently described the
situation in northern Arakan State, western Burma, as “as bad as
anything he has seen in terms the denial of basic human freedoms”.
For these reasons, it is estimated that at least
200,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh. In 1978 and 1991, there were
significant influxes of refugees fleeing across the border, and even
today Rohingyas trickle out one by one, in the hope of finding security
in Bangladesh. However, even in Bangladesh, they are vulnerable. Only
27,000 are recognised by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and live in two official camps.
Thousands more are unrecognised, and live either in Bangladeshi towns
and villages or in temporary ‘makeshift’ camps where conditions are
dire. In the makeshift camps they receive no access to health care or
education, and no rations. Even in the official camps, there is no
formal education beyond the age of 12. One 18 year-old is teaching in
one of the schools, but has no opportunity for further study himself. “I
am compelled to teach, but I would prefer to learn first,” he told me.
“If I stay like this, with no further education, my future life will be
ruined.”
A few years ago, the UNHCR forcibly repatriated at
least 230,000 Rohingyas back to Burma, but many have returned, unable to
survive in their homeland. One refugee said: “As long as human rights
abuses continue in Burma, we cannot go back. We are caught between a
crocodile and a snake. Where can we go?” Another expressed their
dilemma, and statelessness, equally starkly: “The Bangladesh authorities
say we are from Burma. The Burmese regime says we are Bengali. Where
should we go?”
As part of its campaign against the Rohingyas, the
junta regularly stirs up anti-Muslim sentiment among the Buddhist
Rakhine and Burmans, with some success. “The regime uses the Rakhine
against us as part of a divide-and-rule policy,” said one Rohingya. And
so in addition to facing persecution from the regime, the Rohingyas face
discrimination from Burma’s democracy movement too. Many Rakhine and
Burmans in the democracy movement refuse to recognise the Rohingyas as
an ethnic group, and they have been denied membership of the opposition
Ethnic Nationalities Council. There is a dispute even over the term ‘Rohingya’,
and many Rakhine prefer to call them “Arakanese Muslims”, “Burmese
Muslims” or “Bengalis of Burma”.
Some Rakhine, however, have recognised the need to
work with the Rohingyas against their common enemy, the regime. After
all, the Rakhine are also victims of the junta. In schools, teachers use
Burmese and the Rakhine language is banned. Forced labour is widespread.
“The regime is carrying out an attack on our language, identity and
culture,” said one Rakhine. The National United Party of Arakan (NUPA)
has an alliance with the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO).
One NUPA leader told me: “When a people have been living this long
through history, why should they be deprived of their citizenship
rights?”
“The regime is trying to take away our identity,” a
Rohingya leader told me. “We will not be there in the very near future.
The disintegration of our society will take place. Our prime concern is
that we must not be eliminated.” With that context, it is perhaps not
surprising that some Rohingyas have been radicalised, feeling they have
few allies in the world. Militant groups have preyed on their
vulnerability. There are even suggestions that some Rohingyas have been
linked to al-Qaeda. All the more reason, it seems, why it is essential
to speak up for them, and encourage Burma’s democracy movement to be
more inclusive. Not only is there a strong moral case to speak out
against their persecution, but a powerful strategic incentive to do so
as well. As one moderate Buddhist Rakhine told me: “We have to reach out
to moderate Rohingyas, and work with them, because if we don’t, they
will have nowhere else to go but radicalism.” Burma is troubled enough
as it is, without that prospect to add to its woes.
Benedict Rogers is the author of A Land
Without Evil: Stopping the Genocide of Burma’s Karen People (Monarch,
2004), and has visited Burma and its borderlands more than 20 times. He
also serves as Deputy Chairman of the UK Conservative Party’s Human
Rights Commission.
CAUGHT BETWEEN A
CROCODILE AND A SNAKE
The Increasing Pressure on Rohingyas in Burma and
Bangladesh
&
The Impacts of the Changing Policy of UNHCR
Report of the fact-finding mission – April/May 2003
Burma Center Netherlands
Colophon
The Burma Center Netherlands (BCN) is an independent
foundation that aims to inform the Dutch society on developments in Burma.
BCN initiates and coordinates activities that benefit democratisation,
respect for human rights and sustainable development by lobby and advocacy
on EU level. BCN also aims to contribute to a constructive dialogue between
the various groups in Burma.
BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS
Paulus Potterstraat 201071 DA Amsterdam Tel : +31 (0) 20
6716952Fax : +31 (0) 20 6713513E-mail:
bcn@xs4all.nlThis
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view it Website:
www.burmacenter.nl
AUTHOR
Peter Ras
PICTURES
Peter Ras
Cartoon
Alberts Art Productions
Editors
Peter GutterEric van Vessem
Contents
1. From the author … 3
2. Introduction … 5
3. Summary … 6
4. Background Rohingya Refugees … 9
5. Continuing Repression in Arakan, Burma … 11
6. Burmese refugees in Bangladesh … 15
7. Increasing pressure on the recognized Rohingya refugees … 16
8. An uncertain future for undocumented Rohingya refugees … 23
9. Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh … 26
-
The eventual solution … 27
-
Conclusions … 30
-
Recommendations … 31
-
Just a few stories … 33
-
Travel schedule … 36
-
Organizations visited … 37
1. From the author
First of all, I am grateful to all representatives and
individuals for the time and information they shared to support my research.
Second, many thanks to the organizations and
individuals who concretely supported and helped me to visit all areas and
locations of concern. Without them, I would not have had the opportunity to
experience the actual reality of the Burmese Rohingya refugee population and
their poor living conditions.
Last but not least, with utmost respect, I would like
to thank the refugees and the representatives of Burmese (refugee)
organisations who spent time to inform me about their real circumstances and
the problems they face day to day. Their efforts to tell me their stories
were certainly not always without serious personal risks.
BCN is impressed with the good work of so many
organizations and individuals who go great lengths to render practical
support to the refugees of the still continuing repression in Burma. BCN
feels very inspired by the continuing commitment of so many Burmese
refugees, to do whatever possible to contribute to the process towards
democracy and reconciliation in Burma in general and Arakan State in
particular.
Peter Ras, Coordinator, Burma Center Netherlands
2. Introduction “I was born in Burma,
but the Burmese Government says I don’t belong there. I grew up in
Bangladesh, but the Bangladesh Government says I cannot stay here. As a
Rohingya, I feel I am caught between a crocodile and a snake.”From: 10 Years
in Bangladesh, published by M�decins Sans Fronti�res, 2003
In April and May 2003, a representative of Burma Center
Netherlands (BCN) undertook a fact-finding mission to Bangladesh and India.
BCN organized this mission primarily because of serious concern about the
situation of Burmese (Rohingya) refugees in Bangladesh. BCN has been alarmed
by disturbing stories about the changing (possibly even withdrawing) role of
UNHCR in the Burmese refugee crisis in both countries. Moreover, BCN was
informed about the increasing pressure on Burmese refugees in general and on
the Rohingya population in Bangladesh in particular. BCN became worried
about some specific cases of refugees threatened by the authorities in these
two countries neighbouring Burma.
Generally, BCN felt that there is a lack interest for
the fate of the Burmese refugees, especially those residing west of Burma,
and a lack of close contacts with relevant Burmese democratic and ethnic
opposition organizations in Bangladesh and India by Western pro-democracy
movements. BCN strongly believes that there is a need for increasing
contacts with, and knowledge about, the Burmese refugee communities in
Bangladesh and India with their specific backgrounds, concerns, problems,
suggestions and activities.
The representative of BCN met with a large number of
different (local and national) organizations, institutions, political
parties, ethnic groups, INGOs, diplomats, health workers and, of course, the
Burmese refugees themselves.
Not all of the information that was collected, and
certainly no names, have been mentioned in this report because of the high
political sensitivity and confidentiality. The author of this report has
witnessed the exceptional sensitivity and pressures from various sides
during his visits of some Burmese ethnic organisations and the Rohingya-refugee
camps in Bangladesh. The BCN-representative has seen with his own eyes the
major differences of behaviour of the refugees between private and official
meetings. The private meetings were much more relaxed, friendly and open,
such as for example with refugees in Nayapara and Kutupalong refugee camps.
It was in practice quite hard to organize meetings because of strong
monitoring of camp authorities. The meetings with refugees in official
companionship with camp authorities, were characterized by more distance,
less warmth, while participants were not at liberty to speak out freely.
This report, of our latest fact-finding mission, focuses
on the topic of Rohingya refugees.
There are no religious or ethnic minorities in Burma
who have suffered more hardships than the Rohingya Muslims in Northern
Arakan State. The repression of the Burmese junta against them continues, in
spite of the regular (faulty) reports by officials of the Bangladesh
Government, the UNHCR, and the SPDC of course. The Rohingyas face severe
difficulties in their own country, which forced them to leave. Still, small
numbers of new refugees arrive in Bangladesh almost every week or month.
Hundreds of thousands fled to Bangladesh in the (recent) past and although
many returned of their free will or not, many others are still there. It is
obvious that the Burmese junta does not like this people. The junta does not
want them in Burma and tries to do whatever it can to pressurize them by
causing serious difficulties. In practice, there is a clear policy of
discrimination against the Rohingyas in Burma. But also in Bangladesh the
Rohingyas are less and less welcome, and the pressure on them to return to
their ‘homeland’ from local as well as national Government officials is
certainly growing. It seems that the Rohingyas are not welcome anywhere, as
if they are denied real citizenship by any state. The Rohingyas even face
hostilities by the Arakanese-Buddhist people because of sensitivities of the
past. Rohingyas feel pressure everywhere, and the pressure is certainly not
decreasing. Rohingyas have no home, no safe place to go, no shelter and no
guarantee for a safe and peaceful future anywhere, anytime.
BCN did not have the intension to write an extensive
report with all details about historical topics regarding Burma in general,
Arakan State, or the position of the Rohingyas. BCN just intended to write a
compact report, focusing on the actual concerns and recommendations
regarding the Rohingya refugees. BCN believes that there is a necessity for
international donors, (Western) Governments, the European Union, etc. to use
their contacts and efforts to promote positive changes that benefit the
Rohingyas in Burma and Bangladesh.
Burma Center Netherlands
3. Summary
In Arakan (Rakhine) State in Western Burma, the Burmese
military regime (SPDC) and border police (NaSaKa) are still committing
serious human rights violations. Although both peoples in Arakan (Rakhine
Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims) are victims of these crimes, especially the
Rohingyas living in Northern Arakan are marginalized as a people. By
definition, the Rohingyas do not have full citizenship, still suffer from
gross human rights violations, are still forced to perform unpaid labour
(especially in the countryside) and are not free to practice their religion.
The Rohingyas in Arakan/Burma are often denied basic freedoms like the right
to marry, and they are forced to pay the military authorities for all basic
necessities. Rohingyas have no freedom of movement. Finally, often the
military orders them to handle over all there belongings, including their
land, without any compensation. The future of Rohingyas in Arakan still
looks grim.
The Burmese junta accused Rohingya armed groups
(fighting SPDC) of getting support of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network,
unsuccessfully hoping for US-support for their stance. However, there is no
proof of any direct links between the Rohingya armed groups and Al-Qaeda.
In Bangladesh, some 21,000 Rohingya refugees still live
in two refugee camps. They are recognized refugees by UNHCR and the
Bangladeshi authorities, and could officially only be repatriated to Burma
voluntarily. UNHCR is responsible for the voluntary repatriation process and
the protection of the refugees in the camps. A few international
organizations such as WFP, MSF and Concern render practical assistance to
these refugees, including food and health care.
However, refugees as well as (inter)national parties
complain about Bangladeshi camp authorities who are pressing the refugees to
sign for repatriation back to Arakan/Burma. A number of refugees were highly
probably repatriated because of increased, direct or indirect, pressure by
the camp authorities. Refugees feel a constant pressure by the camp
authorities or the mahjees. These are camp group leaders having close
contacts with the camp authorities. Nowadays, almost all refugees are
reluctant to repatriate because of fear about the Burmese military’s
repression. In recent weeks and months, the pressure on the refugees to
repatriate has increased. May 2003 saw a significant increase in the
repatriation of refugees to Burma. In May, 704 refugees were repatriated.
The atmosphere has grown increasingly tense now. This causes doubt and
serious concern. Large numbers of refugees have openly stated to be against
repatriation back to Burma because of the grave military repression in that
country.
UNHCR in Bangladesh plays the complaints down,
regarding the use of force and pressure by the camp authorities and mahjees,
and does not seem to understand that many (inter)national parties, as well
as vast numbers of refugees feel that there is a serious and increasing
problem now. UNHCR does also minimize the actual repression in Arakan/Burma.
This repression has been described, for example, in a number of reports by
ILO, US State Department and Human Rights Watch, published over the last
twelve months.
Furthermore, UNHCR has made a plan to stimulate
‘self-sufficiency’ for the remaining, recognized Rohingya refugees in the
camps. This process will already get started by 1 July 2003. According to
UNHCR, this is partly because of ‘donor fatigue’ resulting in decreasing
funds for UNHCR’s programs in Bangladesh. The role of international
organizations will be decreased, according to the plan, and the role of the
Government of Bangladesh needs to become prominent. UNHCR itself plans to
phase out all assistance by the end of 2004. As a first step, UNHCR will
hand over the actual repatriation process to the Government of Bangladesh by
the first of July, although UNHCR stresses that it will remain responsible
for monitoring the voluntary aspect of repatriations. Although all
(inter)national parties directly and indirectly involved are willing to
cooperate with a plan to promote self-sufficiency, they all complained about
the complete lack of information and consultation by UNHCR. This results in
serious uncertainties among the organizations what to do in the near future.
All parties are extremely worried about the fate of the refugees when
international organizations are not able any more to play a ‘night watcher’s
role’, to prevent any further increasing pressure on, or force toward,
refugees to repatriate. Very concerning is the fact that the Government of
Bangladesh still not recognizes the UNHCR plan. Even worse, UNHCR has never
consulted the refugees about the plan. It seems therefore extremely unclear
whether for example UNHCR’s time frame to implement the plan is realistic,
and whether basic safety and even survival guarantees are included in
UNHCR’s current plan.
In a second plan, UNHCR has dictated that it will
‘streamline’ the health care in the camps by 1 July 2003. Nowadays, MSF,
Concern and the Bangladeshi Ministry of Health (MoH) are responsible for
health care. UNHCR wants MoH to do this on its own. Again, there has not
been any consultation and serious discussions about it with the involved
parties. Moreover, many directly and indirectly involved parties have
serious doubts whether MoH is capable (and even willing!) to guarantee the
current quality level of care provided.
Apart from the officially recognized Rohingyas in the
camps, there are still at least 100,000 (but maybe even 200,000 to 300,000)
more Rohingyas living in Bangladesh. They are not recognized and are seen by
UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh as ‘illegal immigrants’. Many doubt
if this is really true, and blame the government and UNHCR for not being
willing to conduct a new investigation as to why the refugees came to
Bangladesh. Almost all (inter)national actors believe that these refugees
certainly had political reasons to leave Burma, because of the continuing
repression. These people usually work in the informal sector as illegal,
low-paid laborers and are extremely vulnerable to harassment by local people
and police.
A few hundred Rohingyas, most of them residing
illegally, are currently detained. Some were arrested for petty criminal
offences, but more often only because of their ‘illegality’ or false
accusations made by mahjees or local police. Especially the non-recognized
Rohingyas in detention do not receive any legal assistance, and are often
still detained although they should have been released already.
Extremely worrying is the situation of illegal refugees
in the newly established Teknaf ‘makeshift camp’. More then 4,000 refugees
live there under abominable conditions. They do not receive any aid and many
believe that the monsoon (starting early July) will flood everything and
will create a human disaster.
There are a few thousand more Rakhine-Buddhist refugees
in Bangladesh. The vast majority of them live in the areas along the Burmese
border and are not recognized by UNHCR. Only about 40 of them are recognized
and mainly live in Dhaka. They face language problems and believe that UNHCR
should extend their language and skill training to increase their chances
for employment. They have also requested UNHCR to recognize more
Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in the border areas, for example former members of
armed groups fighting the SPDC.
Finally, the relations between both main population
groups of Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists, and their representatives
including politicians, intellectuals, and armed groups, are still very
tense, because of historical hostilities. These sensitivities and
hostilities have always been exploited by the former and current military
regimes in Burma. Many organizations believe there is a need for
reconciliation in Arakan, although this will be a complicated process.
However, reconciliation in Arakan will also benefit a future ‘tri-partite
dialogue’ between the ethnic peoples, NLD and SPDC, as well as a future
democratic Burma. Reconciliation in Arakan could perhaps even prevent new
waves of Rohingya refugees to neighbouring countries in the future. Very
obviously, it seems that without significant political and human rights
improvements in Burma, the current refugee problems will continue.
Therefore, the need for political and economical pressure on the Burmese
military regime, in order to force the junta to reform and democratize, is
seen as utterly important by practically all refugees and Burmese
organizations in Bangladesh.
4. Background Rohingya Refugees
Rohingyas in Burma
Out of Burma’s population of 50 million, there are some
two million Rohingyas. According to the Arakan Historical Society (AHS),
there are some 200,000 more Rohingyas living in Pakistan already for some
time. 500,000 more live in Saudi-Arabia. Some hundreds of thousands
Rohingyas live in Bangladesh.
In Burma, the Rohingyas predominantly live in Arakan
(Rakhine) State, bordering Bangladesh. After the occupation of Arakan State
by the British in 1826, many Islamic Bengali settled in Northern Burma,
between the Buddhist (Rakhine) population and the Islamic Arakanese
(Rohingyas) who had been living there already for centuries. This
immigration continued until the 1930s. From 1936 onwards, mistrust grew
between Muslims and Buddhists in British Burma. This led to large-scale
riots in 1942 between Muslim-Rohingyas and Buddhist-Rakhines in Arakan
State, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. Probably the later dictator
Ne Win played a role in stimulating these riots. Still, the 1942 incident is
widely regarded as a main reason for the current serious sensitivities
between the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine Buddhists in Arakan State.
Arakan had its own identity and it was one of the first areas where an
uprising was started against (colonial and Burman) rule in 1947. Former
dictator Ne Win eventually gave the Arakanese their own state within Burma,
but a number of groups continued their struggle for independence. Some
groups actually supported the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), and some
others supported democracy or were Muslim freedom fighters.
Even nowadays, some guerrilla activities continue by
some armed guerrilla groups (Rohingya organizations as well as Rakhine
Buddhists groups). They are mainly fighting the SPDC for self-determination
and democratic/cultural rights, in the remote forested and mountainous
Bangladesh-Burma border regions.
Refugees
Tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in North Arakan
created serious agitation in the 1970s. General Ne Win ordered the army to
suppress this, resulting in large-scale killings and plundering in 1978.
Some 200,000 Rohingya-Muslims crossed the border then and fled to
neighbouring Bangladesh. According to the Burmese military government, these
people were only Bengalis and did not recognize them as Burmese citizens.
Some 10,000 Muslims died in the refugee camps. The majority of the refugees
returned to Burma after a few years.
The period 1991-92 saw a new wave of refugees who left
Burma because of an increase of large-scale repression. This time, some
250,000 Muslims crossed the border. Again, the Burmese junta, now under the
acronym SLORC, stated that these refugees were Bengali. As before, SLORC
denied them Burmese citizenship. The Muslims settled in about 20 refugee
camps. Because of intense international pressure, the majority of these
refugees were permitted to return to North-Arakan State. However, they still
face many serious difficulties and oppression in Burma. Every month, small
numbers of new refugees from Burma arrive in Bangladesh.
Official Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh
Out of the mentioned 250,000 refugees, in Southeast
Bangladesh (between Cox’s Bazaar and Teknaf) there are still some 21,000
Burmese Rohingyas living in the two official remaining refugee camps of
Nayapara and Kutupalong. The Rohingyas in these camps have been officially
recognized by UNHCR as ‘refugees’. Therefore, UNHCR is responsible for their
survival and safety. UNHCR is responsible for their protection and their
eventual voluntary repatriation to Burma. Officially, no refugees are forced
to repatriate to Burma. UNHCR has requested some INGOs and UN agencies to
actually support the refugees in health care (MSF, Concern) and food rations
distribution (WFP).
However, safety, law and order, including police, in
the camps are the responsibility of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation
Commission (RRRC) under the auspices of the Bangladeshi Ministry of Disaster
Management and Relief. RRRC has installed a Camp in Charge (CiC) as leading
officials in both camps. Some other Bangladeshi ministries are also involved
in rendering some support to the refugees, such as the Ministry of Health.
Undocumented Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh
Apart from the 21,000 Burmese Rohingya Muslim refugees
officially recognized by the UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh, there
is an even much larger number of undocumented Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh. Their number seems to be at least 100,000, but probably 200,000
(as regularly mentioned in the local Bangladeshi press) or even 300,000
(according to the Arakan Historical Society). They have no rights, no help
or assistance from anyone. They are denied citizenship by the authorities of
Bangladesh as well as by the Burmese junta (SPDC). The refugees mainly live
under extremely difficult circumstances in the Bangladesh-Burma border
areas. They often work in the informal sector (for example as rickshaw
drivers) or as low paid labourers in factories without any rights. They are
constantly threatened with (police) harassment. Some refugees returned to
Bangladesh for other reasons and are now living as illegal residents.
Since early 2003, a new (unofficial) ‘refugee camp’ has
arisen in Teknaf in the far southeast of Bangladesh. At least 4,000 refugees
are living there now under horrible circumstances.
A few hundred refugees (mainly those residing
illegally, but also some recognized refugees from the camps) are currently
in detention. Some may have committed criminal offences such as possessing
illegal arms, and others are there only because they are ‘illegal residents’
or because of arbitrary allegations of police or camp authorities.
Non-muslim Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
A very small Rakhine Buddhist refugee population of
approximately 40 people currently lives in and around Dhaka. They fled Burma
in 1988 when the democratic uprisings were quelled by the junta. Almost all
of these refugees are recognized by the UNHCR, which gives them a ‘lump sum’
(small fund) to survive. Finally, there are some thousands of non-recognized
Rakhine Buddhist refugees, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
5. Continuing repression in Arakan, Burma
WORLDWIDE CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARAKAN STATE
During the past 12 months, the harsh repression in
Arakan (Rakhine) State was described in a number of reports by the United
Nations, US State Department, ILO, and Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch, for example, wrote in its ‘World
Report 2003’: “In the wake of international press reports alleging ties
between Al-Qaeda and the Burmese government, the government launched a broad
crackdown on Rohingya Muslims. (…) Tensions between the Buddhist majority
and Muslim minority were still apparent in 2002, and restrictions were
tightened in late 2001. Restrictions on travel by Muslims were far more
rigidly enforced, especially in Arakan State, and the government limited the
number of Muslims allowed to travel to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage.
Muslims claimed they continued to have difficulties getting passports to
travel abroad and in building mosques.” In its report ‘Crackdown on Burmese
Muslims’ (July 2002) HRW wrote: “In Arakan State, a predominantly Muslim
area, human rights violations, including forced labour, restrictions on the
freedom of movement, and the destruction of mosques, have been commonplace.”
The UN-Commission on Human Rights again adopted a
resolution on Burma in April 2003 on its 59th session, and included that it
“strongly urges the Government of Myanmar (…) to end the systematic enforced
displacement of persons and other causes of refugee flows to neighbouring
countries, to provide the necessary protection and assistance to internally
displaced persons and to respect the right of refugees to voluntary, safe
and dignified return monitored by appropriate international agencies.”
The 2002 US State Department Country Report on Human
Rights in Burma said, for example, “During the year, the regime reportedly
implemented policies to consolidate the border with Bangladesh and to
further control the movement of Muslim Rohingyas in Rakhine State. (…) On
the country’s western border, 22,000 Rohingya Muslims remained in refugee
camps in Bangladesh. More than 100,000 Rohingyas lived outside the refugee
camps in Rakhine State with no formal documentation as refugees. In
addition, Rohingyas who have returned to Rakhine State claimed that they
faced government restrictions on their ability to travel and to engage in
economic activity. (…) The Government continued to discriminate
systematically against non-Burmans. Because the regime reserved secondary
state schools for citizens, Rohingya Muslims did not have access to state
run schools beyond primary education and were ineligible for most civil
service positions. There were reports that forced labor of Muslims occurred
in Rakhine State. (…) Members of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine
State, on the country’s western coast, continued to experience severe legal,
economic, and social discrimination. The Government denied citizenship
status to most Rohingyas on the grounds that their ancestors did not reside
in the country at the start of British colonial rule in 1824, as required by
the country’s highly restrictive citizenship law. Persons without full
citizenship faced restrictions in domestic travel. They also were barred
from certain advanced university programs in medicine and technological
fields.”
Last March, the ILO Liaison Officer for Burma, Mrs.
Perret-Nguyen, gave a statement about the actual situation of forced labour
in Burma, saying that, “The situation is really very serious and people
continue to suffer from practices of forced labour. (…) The situation in
areas near to the Thai border where there is continuing insecurity and a
heavy presence of the army, as well as in northern Rakhine state, is
particularly serious and appears to have changed little.”
UNHCR AND BANGLADESHI AUTHORITIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN
ARAKAN
In spite of all these documents, UNHCR in Bangladesh
repeatedly stated towards refugees in the camps that the human rights
situation in Arakan in ‘normalizing’, ‘improving’ and ‘stabilizing,’ for
example during discussions about repatriation. A clear example of this kind
of statement was made by UNHCR during an extensive camp meeting in
Kutupalong on 9 April 2003. UNHCR (and the camp authorities) tried to
convince the refugees to repatriate and to sign a so-called ‘affidavit’.[1][1]
UNHCR did not succeed, because almost all refugees made clear that they were
not willing to repatriate to Burma because of a continuing fear that the
situation has not improved at all. Towards the BCN representative, UNHCR
indeed recognized that the human rights situation in Burma is not well.
However, UNHCR at the same time stressed that according to them, the
situation has improved in the last couple of years. It felt as playing down
the actual problems.
The Kutupalong – Camp in Charge (CiC) even said, “When
some refugees say that they are still afraid about the situation in Burma,
we tell them that now the situation in Burma is good. Refugees who were
repatriated in the past are in a happy mood – we met so many repatriated
families in Myanmar! – we tell the refugees here.”
FORCED LABOUR
Many organizations believe that the use of forced
labour by the Burmese military and the NaSaKa (Burmese border police) is
still significant. It seems as if there is a decrease in the enforcement of
forced labour in the main towns of (Northern) Arakan State, such as in
Maungdaw and Buthidaung. This is probably the result of intense ILO pressure
in recent years, although one representative of a relevant Rohingya
organization denied this and believed that this was mainly because almost
all major infrastructure projects were completed and, therefore, there was
some decrease of forced labour in the last couple of years.
At the same time, however, the enforcement of forced
labour by the Burmese authorities and NaSaKa in more remote areas of Arakan
State has remained unchanged. Some Burmese stressed the point that before
any ILO or other international delegation arrives in Arakan to collect
information regarding forced labour, the regime ‘mobilizes’ the local people
to deny that there is any forced labour continuing in the area where they
live.
The practice of forced labour in Arakan especially
continues nearby army camps (and there are many of these), for example for
the cultivation of land or the cutting of wood. Some Burmese are afraid that
the military will conduct forced labour for the building of a new gas
pipeline in Arakan, which is a joint project of oil companies from Burma,
India and Bangladesh.
NO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
The junta’s control on the restriction on movement has
intensified. The restriction on movement is now even worse then under Ne
Win, some Buddhist Rakhines stressed. One Rohingya representative said that
even two years ago, Rohingyas were still allowed to travel to for example
Sittwe (Akyab, the capital of Arakan), but now even this is not allowed any
more. Rohingyas are normally only allowed to travel 4 kilometers of their
homes. If they want to travel to a nearby village, they need a permit of the
authorities, which is often denied. Travelling for longer distances, for
example to Sittwe or Rangoon is impossible for almost everyone, a Rohingya
academic said.
A senior UN official, working in Burma but visiting
Bangladesh, was very concerned and critical on the situation in especially
North Arakan State, the main area where the Rohingyas live. He called the
area “a prison for Rohingyas”. The severe restrictions on movement do also
create major economic problems for the Rohingyas. Doing business, for
instance, has been made virtually impossible. The Rohingyas who are
financially better off have to hire Buddhist Rakhines to do business for
them outside the region where they are allowed to stay. The lack of freedom
of movement also causes serious limitations on the number of Rohingyas to
finish their higher education. Of course, this has a negative impact for
their (and their people’s) future.
No freedom of marriage
SPDC introduced marriage control for Rohingyas. The
SPDC has created a number of formalities to discourage marrying of
Rohingyas. Rohingya couples who wish to marry have to request permission at
many different levels (township administration, village, sector commander,
military commander). Second, in the nine sectors of the NaSaKa, it seems
that in every sector the rules are different and dependent on the individual
NaSaKa commander. In every sector, not more than one or two couples get
permission to marry each month. In reality, it takes a long time before
permission for marriage is granted. It costs couples a lot of money for
permits and bribes. Most requests for marriage are currently rejected, one
Rohingya leader said.
ARBITRARY TAXES AND CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY
In recent years, the military’s control on the local
economy has increased. People have to pay more bribes, such as bags of rice
at military checkpoints. Even when crossing rivers, people have to pay the
military for it and there is more control in this nowadays. A possible
explanation for this could be the fact that the monthly salary of the
military is not enough to survive, so therefore they ‘need’ to make more
money in order to make ends meet.
Rohingyas have to pay arbitrary taxes on all
sustainable goods. For example, there is a ‘roof tax’, a ‘men tax’, they
have to pay fees if anyone dies or any new baby is born (5,000 kyats per
baby). The military do also regularly confiscate land, belongings and houses
of the Rohingyas. These matters are seen as the root causes for the
suffering of Rohingyas by starvation.
NO CITIZENSHIP
Rohingyas do not receive normal (red) Burmese ID cards,
but instead have white ID cards. In reality this creates serious
difficulties for them, because the military put pressure on all Burmese with
no normal red ID card. The white ID card is widely regarded as a
discriminatory policy. Statements that Rohingyas with a white ID-card have
been given normal, official Burmese citizenship by the Burmese junta, are
nonsense. Rohingyas are still not seen as full Burmese citizens and are,
therefore, facing severe restrictions and pressure.
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
There are still serious concerns about beatings, rape
and even killings in Arakan by the authorities. Kaladan Press, for instance,
mentioned the case of a man who was killed on 13 February 2003 by the police
because he refused to perform forced labour.
UNDERMINING OF RELIGION
In the past few years, a number of mosques were
destroyed by the Burmese military. Renovation of these mosques by the local
people is nearly always strictly forbidden. If people try to renovate a
mosque, they seriously risk arrest.
Role of UNHCR in Arakan/Burma
Many Burmese are worried about UNHCRs role in Arakan
State. UNHCR’s official role is to protect the former, repatriated refugees
and stimulate self-sufficieny among them. “They compromise their mandate
with the regime, for example regarding the white ID-cards for Rohingyas.
UNHCR should more effectively monitor the safety and self-sufficiency of the
repatriated refugees,” one leader of a Rohinga organization said. A Rohingya
academic believed that “All Rohingyas hoped and expected that UNHCR would
guarantee their safety, but later we found out that UNHCR danced to the
tunes of SPDC in Arakan and the Government of Bangladesh”. Many repatriated
refugees face economic difficulties because of the pressure and problems
mentioned before (forced labour, arbitrary taxes, confiscations, lack of
freedom of movement).
The Burmese MI (Military Intelligence) has a close
watch on UNHCR’s activities in Arakan and local employees are almost daily
asked what kind of activities they did, or where they went. Foreign
employees are afraid to become ‘blacklisted’ by the Burmese regime.
It seems difficult for UNHCR in Burma to actually do
anything against the continuing human rights violations committed by the
Burmese military.
UNHCR is currently decreasing its activities in Arakan:
in recent years it decreased its financial support for International NGOs in
Northern Arakan State (working on development, infrastructure and farming).
At the same time, UNHCR-Burma tried to find some alternative new funds.
UNHCR was at least partly successful in this, a senior UN-official from
Burma told. UNHCR in Burma hopes that these NGOs could continue their work
in Arakan as much as possible, although there are still some uncertainties
about this for the future.
6. Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
INTRODUCTION
As mentioned before, there are Rohingya Muslim as well
as Rakhine Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh.
From the Rohingyas, some 21,000 refugees are recognized
by the UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh. They live in the two remaning
official refugee camps Nayapara and Kutupalong in Southeast Bangladesh. All
other Rohingyas in Bangladesh (between 100,000 and 300,000 people) are seen
as ‘illegal immigrants’ by the Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR. They are
mainly squattered in Southeast Bangladesh too and survive because of low
paid (illegal) work, often in the non-formal sector.
There are some 40 Rakhine-Buddhist refugees recognized
by UNHCR. They mainly live in Dhaka. A few thousand more are not recognized
by anyone and mainly live in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, not far from the
Burmese border.
7. Increasing pressure on the recognized Rohingya
refugees
Practical organization in the official refugee camps
currently
UNHCR is responsible for the protection and eventual,
only voluntary, repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Burma. The importance
and relevance of UNHCR’s mandate in Bangladesh in obvious.
Until now, UNHCR has also been responsible for their
welfare and has therefore signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with the
UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the International NGOs Concern and MSF.
WFP is responsible the providing of food in both camps. They cooperate in
this with the local NGO Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS), which
actually transports the food from the three warehouses to the camps. During
the distribution of the food to the refugees, there is always a
representative of Concern or MSF monitoring this, to prevent any unfair
practices. Distribution of the food to all refugees in the camps is actually
performed by volunteers, refugees who receive some extra food in return for
their services.
MSF and Concern are responsible for the health care of
pregnant and feeding women and children under 10 years of age, in Nayapara
(MSF) and Kutupalong (Concern). Concern is also trying to extend its current
small-scale skills training programs for women. Concern is finally
responsible for a few more programs in both camps such as tree plantations
and primary education. The Bangladesh Ministry of Health (MoH) is
responsible for the health care of all other refugees in the camps.
The Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC)
of the Bangladesh Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MDMR) is
officially responsible for safety, law, and order in the camps. In both
camps, RRRC has actually stalled a so-called a Camp in Charge (CiC) who are
the leading officials for daily affairs.
FORCED REPATRIATION
UNHCR denies any forced repatriation in the camps right
now. “Every refugee knows that voluntary repatriation to Myanmar is his
right. The Government of Bangladesh agrees with voluntarism. I do not
believe that there is any forced repatriation at all, ” a senior UNHCR
representative in Dhaka said. However, he mentioned that “sometimes there
are some ‘over-enthusiastic’ people in the camps.” He also added: “I don’t
think people are afraid to talk with us in the camps. When I come, the
refugees surround me. They give us letters and we check them all. I don’t
think people feel they cannot reach us.”
UNHCR’s opinion on the possibility of any enforcement
of repatriation of the refugees to Burma completely contradicts all comments
made by all other local, international and Burmese parties involved, as well
as the statements made by a number of individual refugees. And although, of
course, it could be possible that some individuals exaggerate the actual
situation, it was obvious that UNHCR has a much too na�ve, rosy vision on
this topic and does not recognize that there is a serious concern. A number
of parties, either directly or indirectly involved, mentioned refugees
complaining to their staff about pressure from camp authorities, or problems
created by the mahjees (group leaders). Moreover, the camp authorities of
both camps monitored (or at least tried to monitor) all movements of the BCN
representative himself, who experienced a tense atmosphere. The BCN
representative was not allowed by both CiCs to interview refugees without
the presence of any camp officials and he was not allowed to walk around on
his own.
Whenever the Government of Bangladesh is asked about
the refugees (for example by UNHCR, which regularly asked the Government to
give its support for its ‘self-sufficiency programme’), they always stress
that, “Repatriation is the best option for the refugees.” A Dhaka University
representative said: “The Government of Bangladesh will try to push the
refugees back to Burma. On all levels Government officials say that refugees
are on mercy here: they never really recognize their refugee rights!” A
clear example of this was given during the large camp meeting in Kutupalong
on April 9, where the RRRC official publicly demanded several times that the
best option for the refugees is to repatriate. They had organized a meeting
because the repatriation from Kutupalong had come to a complete halt in
recent weeks. Like mentioned before, he used faulty arguments egarding the
real situation in Arakan/Burma.
However, “the outcome was very clear and negative for
RRRC and UNHCR,” a witness of the meeting explained. “Almost everyone raised
both hands and said ‘no’ and ‘we don’t go’ when they were ultimately asked
to sign the affidavit. In Kutupalong, nobody wants to repatriate.”
Another witness had been at some meetings in Kutupalong
of UNHCR, the CiC and small groups of refugees in January 2003. “The CiC
said to the refugees: ‘This is not your future here. Your future is in your
own country, Myanmar. If you say “yes” to going back, you get your land back
and money for half a year.’ Then the refugees replied: ‘It is not safe there
for us.’ Then UNHCR said: ‘The situation is becoming normal there.’”
Refugees told about the intense pressure they felt from
the camp authorities to repatriate. Especially the mahjees (group leaders)
use different methods to press them to sign the affidavit and to sign that
they are willing to repatriate ‘freely.’ For example sometimes the mahjees
fabricate false accusations against the refugees, some mentioned that the
mahjees used physical or psychological violence and others said that the
mahjees and ‘volunteers’ prevent ‘unwilling’ refugees for getting sufficient
rations or materials to repair their sheds. It is obvious that the mahjees
have a good relationship with the camp authorities (CiC), that they monitor
the activities of the refugees and tell the CiC about this. Refugees often
feel afraid to complain at UNHCR’s Protection Officer, who is formally
responsible for this. All foreigners (and their offices, including
especially UNHCRs office with the ‘complaints box’) are also closely watched
by camp authorities and mahjees. This makes it certainly more difficult for
refugees to complain.
There are also concerning stories about direct
involvement of the CiCs in intimidation and even violence. Some mention
incidents of a few years ago, but other incidents happened more recently.
One serious example was about a refugee woman who accused the CiC of
Kutupalong camp of raping her on 18 February 2003. The CiC had possibly
threatened her not to tell anyone about the incident. However, the victim
gave a full verbal report to UNHCR and the RRRC. Later, she wrote a letter
to the Minister of MDMR on March 20. In May, there was still no reply.
A press agency said that more recently they had heard
about a new incident of another woman who was beaten by the same CiC.
Nobody doubts that at least some of the refugees freely
decided to return to Burma. At the same time, many refugees know other
people who did not repatriate voluntarily. Refugees regularly signed for
repatriation but did not actually want to go. They only signed because of
fear towards the mahjees and camp authorities. Many complain about this to
the staff of the international organizations. “For many years we hear
allegations of abuses and forced repatriation from the refugees”, one
involved person explained. “We always forward these signals to UNHCR.” Some
refugees said they did not complain at the UNHCR staff directly, because of
fear of repercussions. They said they are being monitored all day. Some
refugees manage to give letters to the international parties.
One example of a letter posted in May:
“Dear sister,
First take my lots of honour to you.
Hope you are well. I am also well with the mercy of God.
The next information is that, earlier I gave five
letters to you to send the correct authority. If you can do this for me I
would be pleased to you. If you don’t do that then I will feel is problem.
The Camp in Charge is trying to send me back to Myanmar by two or three
days.
Yours,”
(Name)
Of course, the camp authorities deny all these stories.
“There is no pressure on the refugees to repatriate,” said the CiC of
Kutupalong. But then he continued: “Our Prime Minister has recently visited
Myanmar to solve the refugee problem. For solving this, we are making a
clearing list. We ask people to sign the affidavit.” He concluded with
saying that he always explains the refugees that the situation in Burma is
“very good” now.
One witness of the repatriation process at the Naf
riverside, bordering Burma, explained that all the Rohingyas who were to be
repatriated had to stand in a row. Then the CiC said to the witness: “All
these people are happy to repatriate.” Then he asked the first man in the
row: “Are you happy to repatriate?” And the man replied, looking rather
anxiously, “I am happy to repatriate.”
Over the last couple of months, it seems as if the
Bangladesh Government pressure on refugees is intensifying with new
diplomatic contacts of the current BNP Government of Bangladesh. This
government is more ASEAN and Burmese junta-oriented than the former Awami
League Government. Some months ago, Burmese junta leader Than Shwe visited
Bangladesh. After that, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Khaleda Zia visited Burma
and certainly discussed the ‘refugee topic’.
At the camp level, it is obvious that the authorities
nowadays intensify their efforts to convince the refugees to sign the
affidavit. By signing this, the refugees actually declare that they agree to
be repatriated. Hereby, the camp authorities and the RRRC use false
arguments about the situation in Arakan.
On 21 May 2003, The Bangladeshi Daily Star wrote that,
“The repatriation of Rohingya refugees resumed on Monday May 19 with the
return of 123 refugees from 20 families, and another 150 refugees were
expected to return today”. According to the newspaper, the refugees will be
repatriated twice weekly on Monday and Wednesday, and that “officials said
21,658 refugees are still waiting for repatriation”. In May 2003, a total of
704 refugees from the two camps were repatriated. This shows that the
repatriation process has clearly intensified (until early May, 2003,
repatriation had significantly slowed down because of a lack of willingness
of refugees to repatriate voluntarily, because of fear about repression in
Burma). For some years, repatriation had been done only once a week on
Wednesday. There are serious doubts about the ‘voluntariness’ of the recent
intensified repatriation.
A number of external organizations expressed their
concerns that if WFP, Concern and MSF are not permitted to play any more
future role in the camps, a very relevant ‘night watchers role’ is missing,
probably resulting in a further increasing of pressure on the refugees to
repatriate to Burma against their will.
New UNHCR plan for promoting self-sufficiency for
recognized Rohingya refugees
In 2002, UNHCR-Bangladesh made a concept plan
(‘Self-sufficiency in Bangladesh: Refugees from Myanmar’s Northern Rakhine
State’) to change the efforts of support for the recognized Rohingya
refugees, including:
- The handling over of the practical repatriation
exercise from UNHCR to the Government of Bangladesh by July 1st, 2003;
- The implementation of a self sufficiency-project,
starting from July 1st, 2003.
It seems obvious to UNHCR that the vast majority of the
remaining 21,000 recognized Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh will not return
to their homeland for some more years, until the political and human rights
situation in Burma has improved significantly. Therefore, UNHCR believes
that it is of great importance to stimulate self-sufficiency for this group.
Core elements of the plan include the gradual reduction of the presence of
international organizations starting from July 2003; the take-over of the
camp administration, including the responsibility for the assistance to the
refugees, by the Government of Bangladesh by the end of 2003; and the
stimulation of (at least the temporary) integration of the refugees in the
local communities by income-generating programs, skills training, and
education. The plan is to be completed before January 2004. The role of
international organizations will have to be decreased, according to the
plan, and the role of the Government of Bangladesh needs to become
prominent. UNHCR itself plans to phase out all of its assistance by the end
of 2004. This clause was included in the concept plan. UNHCR also stated
they will close their Cox’s Bazaar Office. However, this closure was
strongly denied by UNHCR officials in Dhaka and Cox’s Bazaar, which is
confusing. If UNHCR is serious about closing their Cox’s Bazaar office, it
would have devastating impacts on the protection and monitoring role of
UNHCR, because it seems impossible to really protect refugees in the
Bangladesh-Burma border regions from an office based in Dhaka.
Almost all parties and individuals who asked about this
self-sufficiency plan, agreed with the necessity of a change with the
current situation of the refugees in the camps. All argued that it is
important to make the refugees more self-sufficient because they have no
future (neither in Bangladesh, nor in Burma) if they remain dependent on
food and other aid from donor organizations for many more years. It is
important that as many people as possible learn to stand on their own feet
and to make them more responsible for their own deeds. Also, many argued
that they believe that because UNHCR faces dificulties because of lack of
funds, as well as possibly ‘donor fatigue’ (although some doubt this), they
have made their plan. All direct involved parties stated that they are most
willing to cooperate with UNHCR to implement the plan in a responsible way.
Some other parties involved said its UNHCR’s task to convince its donors to
continue give support, because of the continuing problems in Burma and
Bangladesh. UNHCR should therefore significantally increase its efforts to
convince them that decreasing funds will create major uncertainties for the
refugees.
At the same time, everybody (all international parties,
Burmese groups and individuals) were extremely critical towards UNHCR about
their ‘self-sufficiency plan’:
- There is an absolute lack of communication with
UNHCR about the plan and its practical implementation. And although
UNHCR denies it, all parties directly or indirectly involved complained
about the lack of communication or even some ‘arrogance’ about this by
UNHCR. UNHCR did not even give their concept plan to its partners (such
as INGOs) in the camps. This suggests a lack of confidence of UNHCR in
its partners.
To date, nobody has seen any action or implementation
plans of UNHCR. One party, for instance, stressed the importance of getting
sufficient information on time about the future living situation of refugees
(open or closed camps/areas, or about the location of markets where the
refugees can sell their products) Even the CiC in Kutupalong complained that
he did not know what kind of changes he could expect after 1 July 2003. Some
bitterly felt that UNHCR was already in the process of finalizing/fixing
everything without any consultation. There is also confusion about whether
or not the UNHCR is planning to close its Cox’s Bazaar Office.
Still, the implementation of the plan has not been
discussed with WFP, Concern, or MSF. This should be done as soon as
possible, and it should be done on the right level (this means on a
national, Dhaka level);
-
There is broad and great concern about the time
frame of the plan, especially regarding the expected growing
uncertainties including food, health care, and safety of the refugees.
The Government of Bangladesh has still not agreed with the plan. UNHCR
has discussed it with the Government several times. However, until now
the Government has still not approved. UNHCR argues, “The Government did
not say ‘No’, so this means ‘Yes’.” This is widely regarded as
hopelessly na�ve: at least it seems that the Bangladesh authorities did
not decide about the plan, but maybe their stance even means that they
do not agree with the plan at all. As long as the Bangladeshi
authorities do not officially give the approval, it will be very
uncertain whether the plan actually can be worked out in a meaningful
way. Safety guarantees for the refugees are necessary, regarding
protection, food, and health care. Until now, the Bangladeshi
authorities have always prevented initiatives of extending skill
programs and higher education. Self-sufficiency of the refugees in a
human way is only practically possible when large-scale skill programs
and higher education are allowed by the Government;
-
Finally, a ‘safety net’ for the transition period
(for example by guarantee of food during this time) as well as a
continuing ‘night watchers role’ by international parties is seen as
utmost important. Nowadays, it is completely vague if this ‘safety net’
for the refugees will be guaranteed in the future. A complexing factor
is for example the fact that WFP will normally only provide food through
the channels of international organizations such as UNHCR or INGOs, and
not directly through any Government channels, to prevent ‘leakages’.
Nowadays, WFP provides food in both camps because of an MoU they have
signed with UNHCR. If UNHCR’s role would become smaller in the future,
food providing could become uncertain. Regarding health care and the
‘night watcher’s role’, there are uncertainties too, for example because
of UNHCR’s plans for streamlining the health and nutricion programs
(more about this in the next chapter of this report). It is unclear if
for example Concern and MSF will (be allowed to) play a role in the
future too. For many reasons, a safety net for the refugees is not yet
guaranteed;
-
It is very uncertain how the refugees could become
self-sufficient in a hostile local community (current jealousy with the
facilities of the refugees, and anxiety about all these refugees who
will have to search for jobs in their districts), and with a lack of
skills and education (also because of the fact that the Bangladeshi
authorities prevent any higher education, large-scale skill training by
for example Concern and WFP. These organizations have regularly stated
that they are willing to provide these programs);
-
In spite of UNHCR’s statements, UNHCR did not
consult the refugees about their self-sufficiency plans. This is widely
seen as a mistake, and UNHCR should seriously consult them instead of
just ‘informing’ them.
UNHCR-PLAN FOR STREAMLINING HEALTHCARE
UNHCR has also stated that it is willing to
streamline the health care in the camps, by July 1, 2003. In
practice, they are willing to handle over all health activities,
currently done by MSF, Concern and MoH (Bangladeshi Ministry of
Health), to MoH only. This is because of a recommendation in a study
of external auditors in 2002. They argued that this is necessary
because the circumstances have changed in the last couple of years.
Because there are less refugee camps now, there is a need for
simplifying the health care programs: they could be handled by just
one organization, MoH, the auditors argued. In connection with this,
one Cox’s Bazaar UNHCR official stressed that this ‘streamlining’ of
the health care is no part of their self-sufficiency plans, it is
just because of the advice of their auditors. However, on the Dhaka
level, UNHCR said that the streamlining of health care is part of
their major plan for self-sufficiency. Again, this is confusing.
All directly and indirectly involved parties
have complained a lot about this streamlining plan.
-
First, again, UNHCR did certainly not
communicate well about the practical implementation of their
plans with all parties involved (of course, at first with MSF
and Concern, but then also with others like WFP). UNHCR sent a
letter to the parties in April, which created much unrest among
them. The letter generates more questions than answers. In the
letter, UNHCR made clear that they had already decided that
Concern and MSF have to hand over their health programs (health
care for children under ten and supplementary, therapeutic
feeding program) to MoH and that there is no discussion possible
whether or not this will really benefit the refugees. None of
the parties know what to do exactly after July 1, and there has
not yet been any serious consultation about their own
streamlining plans by UNHCR. The leading UNHCR representative in
Cox’s Bazaar said he is always willing to discuss the matter,
but that the INGOs do not respond well. This, again, contradicts
the view of the parties involved. However, all of them stressed
the need for tuning in on the national level (Dhaka level).
National staff of all involved parties should discuss the
programs, and not the local-level staff, they argued;
-
Almost everybody involved is extremely
concerned about the quality of care the Bangladeshi MoH would be
able to provide to the refugees. A Dhaka University
representative said he believed that the quality of health care
for the refugees will by definition become worse, as soon as MoH
is responsible for it. Refugees will not have the possibility to
complain about it then, like the local Bangladeshi people could
at least. He also expected ‘leakages’, and pleaded for at least
‘minimal health criteria’ on paper before any handover. “Ask any
Bangladeshi people about the quality of the health care of MoH
and they will be extremely critical about it.”
A Dhaka based UNHCR representative said in
response to this, “The streamlining has been discussed with
everybody extensively. We are not pushing MSF and Concern out, but
we have to streamline. Health care should be given by only one
organization: MoH. We believe MoH will be capable. We know that the
quality of care in hospitals in towns etc. is bad, but in the camps
this is much better. It is not a good attitude just to think MoH is
not capable. We will give trainings to MoH during the handover
time.” But he also agreed, “It’s a challenge for us.”
However, one involved party argued that the
quality of MoHs current health care in the camps is not sufficient
because of lack of staff, as well as that at least some of its staff
is poorly educated. Second, MoH has not any therapeutic feeding
program elsewhere in Bangladesh, so how could they possibly take
over the current program from Concern and MSF? Therapeutic feeding
is of great importance for severely malnourished refugees, according
to one of the directly involved parties.
“MoH does not have the capability now to run
therapeutic feeding programs,” concluded another party.
8. An uncertain future for undocumented
Rohingya refugees
POLITICAL REFUGEES WITH NO RIGHTS
There are at least some 100,000 undocumented
Rohingyas in Bangladesh. Probably their number is even much higher.
The local Bangladeshi press usually mentions around 200,000 and the
Arakan Historical Society believes there are even 300,000. These
undocumented refugees mainly live under extremely difficult
circumstances in the Bangladesh border areas near Burma, in the
Cox’s Bazaar and Teknaf regions. Usually they try to survive by
working in the informal sector (for example as riksha drivers) or as
poorly paid labourers in factories without any rights or protection,
and always in fear of police harassment.
In the remote (mostly forested and mountainous)
Bangladesh-Burma border regions, there are also some small
Rohingya-guerilla groups active, fighting Burma’s SPDC.
The undocumented Rohingyas do not receive any
assistance and are denied citizenship by both the Governments of
Bangladesh and Burma. Many parties said they believe that “every
week or month” a couple of new refugees and families newly arrive in
Bangladesh. This continues all the time. Some say that they do not
want to put to much attention on this issue, because of fear that
the Bangladeshi authorities will force all these illegal Rohingyas
to return to Burma, with uncertain but severe effects.
UNHCR believes that these Rohingyas “are not
new refugees.” A Dhaka University representative heavily criticised
UNHCR about its complete lack of willingness to do anything for this
marginalized group. “How does UNHCR know that this large group of
Rohingyas outside the camps are all just illegal economic
immigrants? A few years ago they interviewed a small number of them
and still they count on this research. UNHCR and the Government of
Bangladesh should do a serious investigation, or UNHCR should press
the Government to allow it to interview these illegal residents and
do a survey on its own!”
An involved international party said, “UNHCR
considers all these people as ‘economic immigrants.’ The question
is: Why did they flee to Bangladesh? The answer is: Because of
forced labour, forced conscription, no freedom to travel etc. Is
this really ‘economical’ or mainly ‘political’…?”
A political Rohingya organization explained,
“These people came to Bangladesh because of forced labour and human
rights violations. They are political refugees, no question about
it. Everybody in Arakan had a garden or a piece of land, so they
originally had jobs and food.”
A Rohingya academic said: “Most people came
here because of forced labour and forced relocations. They were
kicked out of their villages and the military took their belongings.
These people cannot go elsewhere in Arakan or Burma, so where should
they go?”
The extreme consequence: Teknaf
‘makeshift camp’ (Tal)
Early 2003, a new unofficial refugee ‘camp’ was
created in Teknaf, along the Naf River bordering Burma. Nowadays, at
least 4,000 undocumented refugees live here in horrible conditions.
It is just a large slum settlement of housing made from plastic
sheets. In late 2002, because of a Bangladeshi army exercise called
‘Operation Clean Heart,’ thousands of Rohingyas were forced to leave
their homes and had to settle in this area. Most of the Rohingyas
living in the slum came, or came back, to Bangladesh already several
years ago, but some only came half a year ago, according to some
local workers. Some people were formally repatriated from the
official camps and returned to Bangladesh (but are not allowed
anymore to stay in the official camps now). Others had never been in
the official camps before. They fled Burma because of forced labour,
rape incidents, and the fact that they were not allowed to freely
perform their religious life.
The refugees made it very clear that they are
certainly willing to return to Burma, but only if the situation has
normalized and improved. They even prefer the current harsh
conditions they face in Bangladesh than to return to their homeland
in the current abominable situation.
The living conditions in the ‘camp’ are
miserable, with no shade, no sanitary facilities and extremely small
sheds made of plastic sheets. Approximately 1,217 families (over
4,000 people) live here in a very compact and over-inhabited area.
Health conditions are extremely poor and, because the Bangladeshi
authorities officially prevent any health care, diarrhoea, skin and
other infection diseases, worms, malaria etc. are very common.
Because of repeated requests, at least MSF was recently allowed to
give some minimal health education but is still not allowed to
provide any health care.
The slum inhabitants are desperate for some
better conditions. Especially sanitation, shade, and health care.
They explained that during night time, nobody is allowed to enter or
leave the camp. The Rohingyas face hostilities from the local
population, probably because of jealousy when the men of the slum
are given some low-paid, illegal work. The police has told them that
ultimately they have to leave the area, and the people feel
extremely uncertain where they have to go to.
A representative of UNHCR in Dhaka said, “The
Government of Bangladesh say that these people are no refugees, so
therefore we have nothing to do with them. They are squatters. They
have been living in that area for a long time and were forced to
leave their houses by the Bangladesh police.” A UNHCR official from
Cox’s Bazaar stated that he was not able to visit the ‘camp’ to take
a look at the circumstances, because he is not allowed to go by the
Bangladesh authorities. However this seems nonsense, because others
such as the BCN representative were able to visit the camp to get an
impression of the devastating conditions.
The most serious problem the inhabitants of the
slum will face very soon, is the monsoon-period (July-September).
The ‘camp’ is in a low area. And although ironically Kutupalongs’
CiC will be right that “this problem will be over as soon as the
monsoon starts…”, of course it would be extremely inhumane just to
wait for this. It seems that time is running out, and a serious
human disaster will occur soon. Without any assistance, probably the
whole area will be flooded.
Returned repatriated refugees
An unknown but certain number of formally
repatriated people have returned to Bangladesh in the last couple of
years. And although a Dhaka based UNHCR representative played this
down by saying that newly arriving Burmese are just “normal in
border areas, this happens everywhere,” a number of other
organizations and individual refugees do certainly not agree with
this.
One refugee explained, “I know a lot of people,
for example my sister, who were repatriated before and are now back.
This is because they got rations for three months in Burma and these
3 months were OK, but after this they had to earn money themselves
and then they had to pay NaSaKa for everything, even for newborn
babies, marriages, and when someone died. Only 50 girls may be
permitted to marry in a particular area. This is only for Rohingya
people.
In Burma UNHCR uses Burmese translators instead
of Rohingya people, and these translators translate not good and
fair. That is why they are afraid to complain at UNHCR. It is very
tough to talk with UNHCR in Burma. Rohingya people are always in
fear.”
REFUGEES IN DETENTION
Probably some 400 Rohingyas are currently in
detention in Bangladesh. Part of them are recognized refugees from
the two official camps. According to Forum-Asia’s report of 12
February 2003, there are 136, but according to UNHCR in May there
are 73. Some were probably detained because of criminal offences
(for example illegal arms possession), some others just because they
are illegal and some probably because of false or arbitrary
allegations of police and camp authorities. Many refugees have
already been in prison for years, although according to the law they
should have been released already for some time. It seems as if
really nobody cares about them. UNHCR provides the recognized
detainees with legal assistence. The others do not get any
assistance at all. Even local Bangladeshi human rights NGOs have not
yet shown much interest in this topic. Many stressed the need to
pressurize the Bangladeshi authorities to release all non-criminal
refugees.
THE NEED FOR A ‘NATIONAL REFUGEE LAW’
A representative of the Dhaka University
pleaded for a ‘National Refugee Law’. The Government of Bangladesh
should adopt such a law to deal with all the current refugee
problems, including the undocumented people from Burma. Some
Bangladeshi MPs have already strongly argued against the idea of
this kind of law, because they believe that adoption of it would
stimulate more refugees to come to Bangladesh, and the country is
not able to deal with them because of the current poverty and
over-population. The University representative strongly disagreed
with this: “People do not flee depending on the laws in their
neighbouring country, but only flee their own country if the
repression becomes too severe!” The current Law Minister has at
least promised to discuss the ‘National Refugee Law’ with his
colleagues of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Disaster Management
and Relief, but at the moment there aro no high expectations that
they will agree with it.
9. Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in
Bangladesh
Currently, there are some 40 recognized
Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh, mainly in Dhaka. Most of
them came soon after the 1988 demonstrations and the 1990 elections.
There are a few thousand more of them living in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts (and a few in Tenaf region), but they are not recognized by
the UNHCR.
The small group of recognized Rakhine Buddhists
receive some financial assistance by UNHCR, some skill training and
short-period language training.
The Buddhist Rakhines face serious cultural
and, particularly, language problems in Bangladesh. They have asked
UNHCR to extend the current language training. According to them,
those courses need to last for 6 months in order to be useful. The
Rakhines state that they should be given some income during this
period. They feel that UNHCR should provide some semi-skills jobs.
Finally, they believe that UNHCR should officially recognize the
former, often disarmed soldiers of the armed resistance groups. In
some remote Bangladesh-Burma border regions, there are still some
small Rakhine-Buddhist armed groups fighting the SPDC.
Normally, Rakhines-Buddhist refugees are in
contact with the Social Counsellor of the Refugee Counseling
Services Union (RCSU). This NGO deals with the refugee status with
UNHCR. Some Rakhine-Buddhist organizations complained that, although
it was easy for them to contact the Social Counsellor, it usually
takes a long time before all papers and forms are forwarded to
UNHCR. The procedures take too much time. UNHCR replied that
recently they have reduced this period.
UNHCR did not respond very positively on the
other requests until now, stressing that they do already quite a lot
for these refugees. Especially the language problems of the Rakhine-
Buddhists are being played down by UNHCR: “People do not need a
language course for selling cigarettes in the streets”. Many
disagree with this. There are simply not enough opportunities to
work in Bangladesh, and people with a different culture, another
language and not enough skills are not able to find jobs anywhere.
As even the refugees who were recognized by UNHCR do not have a
residence permit, they do not have any legal rights in Bangladesh.
Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable to police harassment.
This often happens, especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
10. The eventual solution
SPDC’S INCREASED REPRESSION OF (ROHINGYA)
MUSLIMS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
After September 11, 2001, SPDC intensified its
repression against (Rohingya) Muslims. The Burmese military junta
accused Rohingya armed groups of getting support of the Al-Qaeda
terrorist network. It is more than likely that with the actions
against Muslims, the SPDC tried to improve its bad name in the
United States. The SPDC hoped unsuccessfully that the US Government
would appreciate the junta’s ‘anti-terrorism’ stance and therefore
loosen its sanctions against the regime. However, none of the
Rohingyas working in academic fields and politics, as well as
Rakhine-Buddhist representatives, seemed to believe that there are
any direct links between the Rohingya armed groups and Al-Qaeda. The
armed Rohingya groups do receive financial support from
organizations in Arab countries, but this does certainly not mean
that there is any evidence about links between these groups and
Al-Qaeda. At the other hand, some Rohingya people living in Pakistan
for many years already joined the Taliban during its war with the US
in late 2001. However, again this does not say anything about any
kind of relation between the Rohingya armed groups and Taliban or
Al-Qaeda.
According to the Arakan Historical Society
(AHS), there are some 200,000 Rohingyas living in Pakistan already
for some time. 500,000 more live in Saudi-Arabia, 300,000 in
Bangladesh and 2,4 million in Burma, an AHS representative said.
NEED FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON
SPDC
The eventual solution for almost all problems
of Burmese refugees in Bangladesh is of course a structural
political improvement of the situation in Burma: democratization and
respect for human rights (including religious rights). Therefore,
more political pressure on the Burmese military junta is necessary.
In this context, many Burmese organizations and individual refugees
stressed the importance of economic pressure such as trade sanctions
and a tourism boycott. Some also referred to the importance of
keeping the Asian neighbouring countries (including China!) involved
and convince them of the need to press the Burmese junta to
normalize the political situation for the benefit of all Burmese
citizens and the refugees.
ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR RECONCILIATION IN ARAKAN
Many Burmese organizations feel that, apart
from political and economic pressure on the Burmese regime, there is
something else which is necessary. Many Rohingya-Muslim as well as
Rakhine-Buddhist organizations mentioned the serious sensitivities
between both populations in Arakan. The area has always been
exploited by the former and current Burmese military regime. In this
light, many refer to the very sad happenings in Arakan in 1942 as
the cause of the still continuing distrust between both peoples, “a
turning point in Arakan history.” During this hectic period in the
Second World War, the British colonial power had to withdraw from
Arakan and Burma because of the Japanese army invading Burma.
Because of the power vacuum in that period, large-scale communal
violence in Arakan broke out, causing tens of thousands of deaths.
It seems that some nationalists in the local administration had
initiated the communal unrest in a kind of a ‘anti-foreigner
hysteria’, trying to move the Muslim Rohingyas out of Arakan.
Former dictator Ne Wins’ BSPP (Burma Socialist
Programme Party) Government, and the successive government of
SLORC/SPDC have always continued an anti- (Rohingya-)Muslim policy.
A few armed groups, Rakhine-Buddhist as well as
Rohingya-Mulsims, still fight the SPDC today. They mainly strive for
the self-determination of Arakan. There are two Rohingya-armed
groups: Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) and Rohingya
Solidarity Organization (RSO). Both strive for self-determination
and recognition of the cultural/religious rights of the Rohingya
Muslims in Arakan. ARNO seems to be more secular and strives for
democracy, while RSO is a bit more Islamic, but seems to have been
moderated in recent years. The Buddhist-Rakhine armed groups are
National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) and Arakan Liberation Party
(ALP). They both want democracy. ALP strives for self-determination
and NUPA is officially in favour of an independent Arakan, although
it realises that ‘self-determination’ is most feasible. However,
some Buddhist Rakhine and Rohingya Muslims argue that the armed
groups only play a minor role nowadays.
Although there are a few positive developments
in the last couple of years, such as the establishment of the Arakan
Independence Alliance (AIA) by ARNO and NUPA, the majority of the
Rohingya-Muslim and Rakhine-Buddhist peoples still distrust each
other. This also results in a continuing cold non-relationship
between most Rohingya and Rakhine-Buddhist organizations and armed
groups. The move of NUPA, probably the only armed Rakhine-Buddhist
organization that de facto recognizes the Rohingyas, in first
instance resulted in a huge amount of criticism from the Arakan
League for Democracy (ALD), ALP and Rakhine Buddhists in general.
The SPDC is the only party benefiting from the
continuing, extremely sensitive relationship between Rohingya-Muslim
politicians, armed groups, journalists, intellectuals etc. and their
Rakhine-Buddhist counterparts. Some organizations and individuals
seem to have been rather narrow-minded until now, and mainly focus
on internal differences in Arakan instead of looking at the broader
picture of how to cooperate towards national reconciliation and
democracy.
Therefore, serious efforts are necessary in
order to support a reconciliation process in Arakan. This is also
invaluable when Arakan has to play a role in a future tri-partite
dialogue between NLD, ethnic minorities and SPDC. Without an
Arakanese reconciliation process, a durable peace in Arakan, even in
a future democratic Burma, will be extremely uncertain. New waves of
Rohingya refugees to neighbouring countries remain imaginable even
when Burma becomes a democracy.
According to some Rohingya and Buddhist-Rakhine
organizations, the international community (including EU and US),
the main Burmese opposition parties (especially NLD, NCUB, NCGUB,
UNA, ENSCC) and the Arakanese Muslim Rohingyas and Rakhine
Buddhists) have to play an active role to achieve reconcilitation in
Arakan:
-
The international community should support
and wherever possible facilitate an Arakanese reconciliation
process;
-
The Burmese democratic opposition and
ethnic umbrella organizations should actively support a
reconciliation process in Arakan. They need to recognize
relevant Rohingya organizations. Formal contacts with these
organizations should be increased. The Burmese opposition should
not just repeat ‘we will handle this affair after we have
achieved democracy’, but should instead play an active
moderating and mediating role between all relevant Arakanese
groups;
-
All involved Rakhine-Buddhist and Muslim-Rohingya
organizations, MPs, intellectuals, armed groups, journalists
etc. should play a constructive role and participate in the
much-needed reconciliation process. Therefore, it will be
necessary that representatives of both Rohingya Muslims and
Rakhine Buddhiss recognize and respect each other and try to
move a step forward. Only repeating the difficulties and
sensitivities of the past would not be very constructive.
An Arakanese reconciliation process will
certainly be not easy, many organizations argued. Some even feel
that it will be a ‘mission impossible’. But at the same time, the
majority seem to understand that Arakanese reconciliation is of
great importance for today’s struggle for freedom and human rights,
as well as for tomorrow’s peace.
11. Conclusions
The core problem of the Rohingya people is
still the discriminatory and repressive policy of the Burmese junta
(SPDC) in Arakan State. Because of the continuation of forced labour,
restrictions on the freedom of movement, discriminatory taxes,
confiscation of land etc. Rohingyas continue to flee to Bangladesh. Many
refugees nowadays living in Bangladesh refuse to repatriate to Burma
voluntarily because of their fear of repression.
At the same time, Rohingyas are on a
constant pressure by the Bangladeshi authorities to repatriate to Burma.
This pressure has significantly increased in recent weeks and months.
Camp authorities in the two remaining official Rohingya refugee camps in
Bangladesh use different methods to press refugees, who are increasingly
threatened by this.
UNHCR has made plans to stimulate
self-sufficiency for these recognized refugees. Although all involved
parties accept the relevance of this plan, there are serious concerns
about the lack of communication and consultation about this plan by
UNHCR. The same concerns are felt by UNHCRs second plan to ‘streamline’
its health care in the camps. There are serious doubts about the
time-frame of the plan and the impact of an eventual withdrawing of
international organizations (as ‘nightwatchers’) from the camps. There
are also concerns about the (lack of) possibilities and maybe even
willingness of the Government of Bangladesh (and for example its
Ministry of Health) to agree with UNHCRs plans and to actively support
it.
Except of the recognized Rohingya refugees,
there are 100,000 – 300,000 undocumented Rohingya refugees in
Bangladesh. They survive without any rights and are in vulnerable
condition. The current policy of the Bangladeshi authorities (and UNHCR)
which denies any involvement and humanitarian support is not humane. The
Bangladeshi authorities and UNHCR have no sufficient information how
many undocumented Rohingyas exactly live in Bangladesh and their reasons
for fleeing to Bangladesh. Because these refugees are officially denied
any kind of (humanitarian) aid, they often live in unbearable
conditions. An extreme example is the newly established Teknaf
‘makeshift camp’, where 4,000 refugees are hiding now, and which will
possibly be swept away by the monsoon rains.
As long as the current political and human
rights problems in Burma/Arakan continue, the responsibility of the
Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR remains to protect the refugees from
Burma and to guarantee them protection and a bearable life. Because the
conditions In the camps are deteriorating, there is now for them an even
more urgent need to increase their efforts.
