Arakaneses at the”brink of extermination”

Arakanese Muslims are ethnically and culturally closely related to the Bengali people in the area surrounding Chittagong, but have lived in Burma for generations.

Burma’s Muslim Rohingya Minority Dwell at the “Brink of Extermination”

 

It is not often you meet someone who tells you that he is from “a people at the brink of extermination.” But the testimonies from refugees in a remote corner of southern Bangladesh, on the border with Burma, justify that assessment. For the Rohingya people, a Muslim minority in northern Arakan State, western Burma, are a stateless people whose very identity is denied.

All the people of Burma are suffering at the hands of one of the world’s most brutal, and illegitimate, military regimes. From time to time Burma’s crisis hits the headlines, as it did with protests led by Buddhist monks last September, and Cyclone Nargis in May this year. In between such events, however, Burma fades from the world’s attention.

If Burma as a whole is under-reported, the people on its western borders are almost unknown to the world. Journalists, activists and aid agencies who visit the region tend to head for the Thailand-Burma border, where access to refugees, displaced people and democracy groups is greatest.

Few visit Burma’s borders with India, where a famine is unfolding, or with China, where women are trafficked into prostitution, and fewer still make it to the Bangladesh border where a slow, forgotten genocide is taking place.

 

The Rohingya people are ethnically and culturally closely related to the Bengali people in the area surrounding Chittagong, but have lived in Burma for generations. While their precise history may be debated, there is no doubt that they are not newcomers to the country. Yet unlike all the other ethnic groups in Burma, which although severely persecuted by the regime are at least recognised as citizens, the Rohingyas are regarded as “temporary residents” and denied full citizenship status. They are required to obtain permission before marrying, and a permit can take several years to secure. Movement is severely restricted – Rohingyas must obtain permission to travel even from one village to another, impeding access to medical care and education. As ‘non-citizens’, Rohingyas cannot be employed as teachers, nurses, civil servants or in any public service, and in Rohingya areas teachers, mostly from the Buddhist Rakhine ethnic group, sometimes fail to turn up for an entire year, disrupting educational opportunities for the Rohingyas. Rape and forced labour are widespread, and Rohingyas are singled out by the authorities for extortion. Soldiers demand money from them, and when they cannot pay they are arrested and tortured.

 

On a visit to the Bangladesh-Burma border, I heard numerous accounts of these violations from Rohingya refugees. And they were confirmed by three defectors who had escaped from Burma’s military. The defectors, who had served in the Burma Army’s border security force known as the ‘Na Sa Ka’, said that the Rohingya were specifically targeted for extortion. One said: “Throughout my life in the Na Sa Ka, I was used to this system of arresting Muslims, asking for money, torturing them, every day. We only arrested Muslims, not Rakhines.”

 

The Rohingyas face religious persecution as well. It is almost impossible to obtain permission to renovate, repair, rebuild or extend mosques or other religious buildings. In the past three years, 12 mosques in northern Arakan have been demolished, and a large number were closed in 2006. Since 1962, I was told, not a single new mosque has been built. Religious leaders have been jailed for illegally renovating mosques.

 

A senior UN official, who has served in Darfur, Somalia and other humanitarian crisis situations and, in the words of a foreign diplomat, “knows misery when he sees it”, recently described the situation in northern Arakan State, western Burma, as “as bad as anything he has seen in terms the denial of basic human freedoms”.

 

For these reasons, it is estimated that at least 200,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh. In 1978 and 1991, there were significant influxes of refugees fleeing across the border, and even today Rohingyas trickle out one by one, in the hope of finding security in Bangladesh. However, even in Bangladesh, they are vulnerable. Only 27,000 are recognised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and live in two official camps. Thousands more are unrecognised, and live either in Bangladeshi towns and villages or in temporary ‘makeshift’ camps where conditions are dire. In the makeshift camps they receive no access to health care or education, and no rations. Even in the official camps, there is no formal education beyond the age of 12. One 18 year-old is teaching in one of the schools, but has no opportunity for further study himself. “I am compelled to teach, but I would prefer to learn first,” he told me. “If I stay like this, with no further education, my future life will be ruined.”

 

A few years ago, the UNHCR forcibly repatriated at least 230,000 Rohingyas back to Burma, but many have returned, unable to survive in their homeland. One refugee said: “As long as human rights abuses continue in Burma, we cannot go back. We are caught between a crocodile and a snake. Where can we go?” Another expressed their dilemma, and statelessness, equally starkly: “The Bangladesh authorities say we are from Burma. The Burmese regime says we are Bengali. Where should we go?”

 

As part of its campaign against the Rohingyas, the junta regularly stirs up anti-Muslim sentiment among the Buddhist Rakhine and Burmans, with some success. “The regime uses the Rakhine against us as part of a divide-and-rule policy,” said one Rohingya. And so in addition to facing persecution from the regime, the Rohingyas face discrimination from Burma’s democracy movement too. Many Rakhine and Burmans in the democracy movement refuse to recognise the Rohingyas as an ethnic group, and they have been denied membership of the opposition Ethnic Nationalities Council. There is a dispute even over the term ‘Rohingya’, and many Rakhine prefer to call them “Arakanese Muslims”, “Burmese Muslims” or “Bengalis of Burma”.

 

Some Rakhine, however, have recognised the need to work with the Rohingyas against their common enemy, the regime. After all, the Rakhine are also victims of the junta. In schools, teachers use Burmese and the Rakhine language is banned. Forced labour is widespread. “The regime is carrying out an attack on our language, identity and culture,” said one Rakhine. The National United Party of Arakan (NUPA) has an alliance with the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO). One NUPA leader told me: “When a people have been living this long through history, why should they be deprived of their citizenship rights?”

 

“The regime is trying to take away our identity,” a Rohingya leader told me. “We will not be there in the very near future. The disintegration of our society will take place. Our prime concern is that we must not be eliminated.” With that context, it is perhaps not surprising that some Rohingyas have been radicalised, feeling they have few allies in the world. Militant groups have preyed on their vulnerability. There are even suggestions that some Rohingyas have been linked to al-Qaeda. All the more reason, it seems, why it is essential to speak up for them, and encourage Burma’s democracy movement to be more inclusive. Not only is there a strong moral case to speak out against their persecution, but a powerful strategic incentive to do so as well. As one moderate Buddhist Rakhine told me: “We have to reach out to moderate Rohingyas, and work with them, because if we don’t, they will have nowhere else to go but radicalism.” Burma is troubled enough as it is, without that prospect to add to its woes.

 

Benedict Rogers is the author of A Land Without Evil: Stopping the Genocide of Burma’s Karen People (Monarch, 2004), and has visited Burma and its borderlands more than 20 times. He also serves as Deputy Chairman of the UK Conservative Party’s Human Rights Commission.

CAUGHT BETWEEN A CROCODILE AND A SNAKE

&
The Impacts of the Changing Policy of UNHCR

Report of the fact-finding mission – April/May 2003
Burma Center Netherlands

Colophon

BURMA CENTER NETHERLANDS

Paulus Potterstraat 201071 DA Amsterdam Tel : +31 (0) 20 6716952Fax : +31 (0) 20 6713513E-mail: bcn@xs4all.nlThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it Website: www.burmacenter.nl

AUTHOR

Peter Ras

PICTURES

Peter Ras
Cartoon
Alberts Art Productions
Editors
Peter GutterEric van Vessem
Contents
1. From the author … 3
2. Introduction … 5
3. Summary … 6
4. Background Rohingya Refugees … 9
5. Continuing Repression in Arakan, Burma … 11
6. Burmese refugees in Bangladesh … 15
7. Increasing pressure on the recognized Rohingya refugees … 16
8. An uncertain future for undocumented Rohingya refugees … 23
9. Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh … 26

1. The eventual solution … 27

1. Conclusions … 30

1. Recommendations … 31

1. Just a few stories … 33

1. Travel schedule … 36

1. Organizations visited … 37

1. From the author

Peter Ras, Coordinator, Burma Center Netherlands

This report, of our latest fact-finding mission, focuses on the topic of Rohingya refugees.

Burma Center Netherlands
3. Summary

4. Background Rohingya Refugees

Rohingyas in Burma

Refugees

Official Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh

Undocumented Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh

Non-muslim Burmese refugees in Bangladesh

5. Continuing repression in Arakan, Burma

WORLDWIDE CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARAKAN STATE

UNHCR AND BANGLADESHI AUTHORITIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARAKAN

FORCED LABOUR

NO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

No freedom of marriage

ARBITRARY TAXES AND CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY

NO CITIZENSHIP

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

UNDERMINING OF RELIGION

Role of UNHCR in Arakan/Burma

6. Burmese refugees in Bangladesh

INTRODUCTION

As mentioned before, there are Rohingya Muslim as well as Rakhine Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh.

7. Increasing pressure on the recognized Rohingya refugees

Practical organization in the official refugee camps currently

FORCED REPATRIATION

One example of a letter posted in May:
“Dear sister,
First take my lots of honour to you.
Hope you are well. I am also well with the mercy of God.

Yours,”
(Name)

New UNHCR plan for promoting self-sufficiency for recognized Rohingya refugees

1. The handling over of the practical repatriation exercise from UNHCR to the Government of Bangladesh by July 1st, 2003;
2. The implementation of a self sufficiency-project, starting from July 1st, 2003.

At the same time, everybody (all international parties, Burmese groups and individuals) were extremely critical towards UNHCR about their ‘self-sufficiency plan’:

• There is broad and great concern about the time frame of the plan, especially regarding the expected growing uncertainties including food, health care, and safety of the refugees. The Government of Bangladesh has still not agreed with the plan. UNHCR has discussed it with the Government several times. However, until now the Government has still not approved. UNHCR argues, “The Government did not say ‘No’, so this means ‘Yes’.” This is widely regarded as hopelessly naïve: at least it seems that the Bangladesh authorities did not decide about the plan, but maybe their stance even means that they do not agree with the plan at all. As long as the Bangladeshi authorities do not officially give the approval, it will be very uncertain whether the plan actually can be worked out in a meaningful way. Safety guarantees for the refugees are necessary, regarding protection, food, and health care. Until now, the Bangladeshi authorities have always prevented initiatives of extending skill programs and higher education. Self-sufficiency of the refugees in a human way is only practically possible when large-scale skill programs and higher education are allowed by the Government;
• Finally, a ‘safety net’ for the transition period (for example by guarantee of food during this time) as well as a continuing ‘night watchers role’ by international parties is seen as utmost important. Nowadays, it is completely vague if this ‘safety net’ for the refugees will be guaranteed in the future. A complexing factor is for example the fact that WFP will normally only provide food through the channels of international organizations such as UNHCR or INGOs, and not directly through any Government channels, to prevent ‘leakages’. Nowadays, WFP provides food in both camps because of an MoU they have signed with UNHCR. If UNHCR’s role would become smaller in the future, food providing could become uncertain. Regarding health care and the ‘night watcher’s role’, there are uncertainties too, for example because of UNHCR’s plans for streamlining the health and nutricion programs (more about this in the next chapter of this report). It is unclear if for example Concern and MSF will (be allowed to) play a role in the future too. For many reasons, a safety net for the refugees is not yet guaranteed;
• It is very uncertain how the refugees could become self-sufficient in a hostile local community (current jealousy with the facilities of the refugees, and anxiety about all these refugees who will have to search for jobs in their districts), and with a lack of skills and education (also because of the fact that the Bangladeshi authorities prevent any higher education, large-scale skill training by for example Concern and WFP. These organizations have regularly stated that they are willing to provide these programs);
• In spite of UNHCR’s statements, UNHCR did not consult the refugees about their self-sufficiency plans. This is widely seen as a mistake, and UNHCR should seriously consult them instead of just ‘informing’ them.

   

  UNHCR-PLAN FOR STREAMLINING HEALTHCARE

  UNHCR has also stated that it is willing to streamline the health care in the camps, by July 1, 2003. In practice, they are willing to handle over all health activities, currently done by MSF, Concern and MoH (Bangladeshi Ministry of Health), to MoH only. This is because of a recommendation in a study of external auditors in 2002. They argued that this is necessary because the circumstances have changed in the last couple of years. Because there are less refugee camps now, there is a need for simplifying the health care programs: they could be handled by just one organization, MoH, the auditors argued. In connection with this, one Cox’s Bazaar UNHCR official stressed that this ‘streamlining’ of the health care is no part of their self-sufficiency plans, it is just because of the advice of their auditors. However, on the Dhaka level, UNHCR said that the streamlining of health care is part of their major plan for self-sufficiency. Again, this is confusing.

  All directly and indirectly involved parties have complained a lot about this streamlining plan.

  • First, again, UNHCR did certainly not communicate well about the practical implementation of their plans with all parties involved (of course, at first with MSF and Concern, but then also with others like WFP). UNHCR sent a letter to the parties in April, which created much unrest among them. The letter generates more questions than answers. In the letter, UNHCR made clear that they had already decided that Concern and MSF have to hand over their health programs (health care for children under ten and supplementary, therapeutic feeding program) to MoH and that there is no discussion possible whether or not this will really benefit the refugees. None of the parties know what to do exactly after July 1, and there has not yet been any serious consultation about their own streamlining plans by UNHCR. The leading UNHCR representative in Cox’s Bazaar said he is always willing to discuss the matter, but that the INGOs do not respond well. This, again, contradicts the view of the parties involved. However, all of them stressed the need for tuning in on the national level (Dhaka level). National staff of all involved parties should discuss the programs, and not the local-level staff, they argued;
  • Almost everybody involved is extremely concerned about the quality of care the Bangladeshi MoH would be able to provide to the refugees. A Dhaka University representative said he believed that the quality of health care for the refugees will by definition become worse, as soon as MoH is responsible for it. Refugees will not have the possibility to complain about it then, like the local Bangladeshi people could at least. He also expected ‘leakages’, and pleaded for at least ‘minimal health criteria’ on paper before any handover. “Ask any Bangladeshi people about the quality of the health care of MoH and they will be extremely critical about it.”

  A Dhaka based UNHCR representative said in response to this, “The streamlining has been discussed with everybody extensively. We are not pushing MSF and Concern out, but we have to streamline. Health care should be given by only one organization: MoH. We believe MoH will be capable. We know that the quality of care in hospitals in towns etc. is bad, but in the camps this is much better. It is not a good attitude just to think MoH is not capable. We will give trainings to MoH during the handover time.” But he also agreed, “It’s a challenge for us.”

  However, one involved party argued that the quality of MoHs current health care in the camps is not sufficient because of lack of staff, as well as that at least some of its staff is poorly educated. Second, MoH has not any therapeutic feeding program elsewhere in Bangladesh, so how could they possibly take over the current program from Concern and MSF? Therapeutic feeding is of great importance for severely malnourished refugees, according to one of the directly involved parties.

  “MoH does not have the capability now to run therapeutic feeding programs,” concluded another party.

  8. An uncertain future for undocumented Rohingya refugees

  POLITICAL REFUGEES WITH NO RIGHTS

  There are at least some 100,000 undocumented Rohingyas in Bangladesh. Probably their number is even much higher. The local Bangladeshi press usually mentions around 200,000 and the Arakan Historical Society believes there are even 300,000. These undocumented refugees mainly live under extremely difficult circumstances in the Bangladesh border areas near Burma, in the Cox’s Bazaar and Teknaf regions. Usually they try to survive by working in the informal sector (for example as riksha drivers) or as poorly paid labourers in factories without any rights or protection, and always in fear of police harassment.

  In the remote (mostly forested and mountainous) Bangladesh-Burma border regions, there are also some small Rohingya-guerilla groups active, fighting Burma’s SPDC.

  The undocumented Rohingyas do not receive any assistance and are denied citizenship by both the Governments of Bangladesh and Burma. Many parties said they believe that “every week or month” a couple of new refugees and families newly arrive in Bangladesh. This continues all the time. Some say that they do not want to put to much attention on this issue, because of fear that the Bangladeshi authorities will force all these illegal Rohingyas to return to Burma, with uncertain but severe effects.

  UNHCR believes that these Rohingyas “are not new refugees.” A Dhaka University representative heavily criticised UNHCR about its complete lack of willingness to do anything for this marginalized group. “How does UNHCR know that this large group of Rohingyas outside the camps are all just illegal economic immigrants? A few years ago they interviewed a small number of them and still they count on this research. UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh should do a serious investigation, or UNHCR should press the Government to allow it to interview these illegal residents and do a survey on its own!”

  An involved international party said, “UNHCR considers all these people as ‘economic immigrants.’ The question is: Why did they flee to Bangladesh? The answer is: Because of forced labour, forced conscription, no freedom to travel etc. Is this really ‘economical’ or mainly ‘political’…?”

  A political Rohingya organization explained, “These people came to Bangladesh because of forced labour and human rights violations. They are political refugees, no question about it. Everybody in Arakan had a garden or a piece of land, so they originally had jobs and food.”

  A Rohingya academic said: “Most people came here because of forced labour and forced relocations. They were kicked out of their villages and the military took their belongings. These people cannot go elsewhere in Arakan or Burma, so where should they go?”

  The extreme consequence: Teknaf ‘makeshift camp’ (Tal)

  Early 2003, a new unofficial refugee ‘camp’ was created in Teknaf, along the Naf River bordering Burma. Nowadays, at least 4,000 undocumented refugees live here in horrible conditions. It is just a large slum settlement of housing made from plastic sheets. In late 2002, because of a Bangladeshi army exercise called ‘Operation Clean Heart,’ thousands of Rohingyas were forced to leave their homes and had to settle in this area. Most of the Rohingyas living in the slum came, or came back, to Bangladesh already several years ago, but some only came half a year ago, according to some local workers. Some people were formally repatriated from the official camps and returned to Bangladesh (but are not allowed anymore to stay in the official camps now). Others had never been in the official camps before. They fled Burma because of forced labour, rape incidents, and the fact that they were not allowed to freely perform their religious life.

  The refugees made it very clear that they are certainly willing to return to Burma, but only if the situation has normalized and improved. They even prefer the current harsh conditions they face in Bangladesh than to return to their homeland in the current abominable situation.

  The living conditions in the ‘camp’ are miserable, with no shade, no sanitary facilities and extremely small sheds made of plastic sheets. Approximately 1,217 families (over 4,000 people) live here in a very compact and over-inhabited area. Health conditions are extremely poor and, because the Bangladeshi authorities officially prevent any health care, diarrhoea, skin and other infection diseases, worms, malaria etc. are very common. Because of repeated requests, at least MSF was recently allowed to give some minimal health education but is still not allowed to provide any health care.

  The slum inhabitants are desperate for some better conditions. Especially sanitation, shade, and health care. They explained that during night time, nobody is allowed to enter or leave the camp. The Rohingyas face hostilities from the local population, probably because of jealousy when the men of the slum are given some low-paid, illegal work. The police has told them that ultimately they have to leave the area, and the people feel extremely uncertain where they have to go to.

  A representative of UNHCR in Dhaka said, “The Government of Bangladesh say that these people are no refugees, so therefore we have nothing to do with them. They are squatters. They have been living in that area for a long time and were forced to leave their houses by the Bangladesh police.” A UNHCR official from Cox’s Bazaar stated that he was not able to visit the ‘camp’ to take a look at the circumstances, because he is not allowed to go by the Bangladesh authorities. However this seems nonsense, because others such as the BCN representative were able to visit the camp to get an impression of the devastating conditions.

  The most serious problem the inhabitants of the slum will face very soon, is the monsoon-period (July-September). The ‘camp’ is in a low area. And although ironically Kutupalongs’ CiC will be right that “this problem will be over as soon as the monsoon starts…”, of course it would be extremely inhumane just to wait for this. It seems that time is running out, and a serious human disaster will occur soon. Without any assistance, probably the whole area will be flooded.

  Returned repatriated refugees

  An unknown but certain number of formally repatriated people have returned to Bangladesh in the last couple of years. And although a Dhaka based UNHCR representative played this down by saying that newly arriving Burmese are just “normal in border areas, this happens everywhere,” a number of other organizations and individual refugees do certainly not agree with this.

  One refugee explained, “I know a lot of people, for example my sister, who were repatriated before and are now back. This is because they got rations for three months in Burma and these 3 months were OK, but after this they had to earn money themselves and then they had to pay NaSaKa for everything, even for newborn babies, marriages, and when someone died. Only 50 girls may be permitted to marry in a particular area. This is only for Rohingya people.

  In Burma UNHCR uses Burmese translators instead of Rohingya people, and these translators translate not good and fair. That is why they are afraid to complain at UNHCR. It is very tough to talk with UNHCR in Burma. Rohingya people are always in fear.”

  REFUGEES IN DETENTION

  Probably some 400 Rohingyas are currently in detention in Bangladesh. Part of them are recognized refugees from the two official camps. According to Forum-Asia’s report of 12 February 2003, there are 136, but according to UNHCR in May there are 73. Some were probably detained because of criminal offences (for example illegal arms possession), some others just because they are illegal and some probably because of false or arbitrary allegations of police and camp authorities. Many refugees have already been in prison for years, although according to the law they should have been released already for some time. It seems as if really nobody cares about them. UNHCR provides the recognized detainees with legal assistence. The others do not get any assistance at all. Even local Bangladeshi human rights NGOs have not yet shown much interest in this topic. Many stressed the need to pressurize the Bangladeshi authorities to release all non-criminal refugees.

  THE NEED FOR A ‘NATIONAL REFUGEE LAW’

  A representative of the Dhaka University pleaded for a ‘National Refugee Law’. The Government of Bangladesh should adopt such a law to deal with all the current refugee problems, including the undocumented people from Burma. Some Bangladeshi MPs have already strongly argued against the idea of this kind of law, because they believe that adoption of it would stimulate more refugees to come to Bangladesh, and the country is not able to deal with them because of the current poverty and over-population. The University representative strongly disagreed with this: “People do not flee depending on the laws in their neighbouring country, but only flee their own country if the repression becomes too severe!” The current Law Minister has at least promised to discuss the ‘National Refugee Law’ with his colleagues of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Disaster Management and Relief, but at the moment there aro no high expectations that they will agree with it.

  9. Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh

  Currently, there are some 40 recognized Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh, mainly in Dhaka. Most of them came soon after the 1988 demonstrations and the 1990 elections. There are a few thousand more of them living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (and a few in Tenaf region), but they are not recognized by the UNHCR.

  The small group of recognized Rakhine Buddhists receive some financial assistance by UNHCR, some skill training and short-period language training.

  The Buddhist Rakhines face serious cultural and, particularly, language problems in Bangladesh. They have asked UNHCR to extend the current language training. According to them, those courses need to last for 6 months in order to be useful. The Rakhines state that they should be given some income during this period. They feel that UNHCR should provide some semi-skills jobs. Finally, they believe that UNHCR should officially recognize the former, often disarmed soldiers of the armed resistance groups. In some remote Bangladesh-Burma border regions, there are still some small Rakhine-Buddhist armed groups fighting the SPDC.

  Normally, Rakhines-Buddhist refugees are in contact with the Social Counsellor of the Refugee Counseling Services Union (RCSU). This NGO deals with the refugee status with UNHCR. Some Rakhine-Buddhist organizations complained that, although it was easy for them to contact the Social Counsellor, it usually takes a long time before all papers and forms are forwarded to UNHCR. The procedures take too much time. UNHCR replied that recently they have reduced this period.

  UNHCR did not respond very positively on the other requests until now, stressing that they do already quite a lot for these refugees. Especially the language problems of the Rakhine- Buddhists are being played down by UNHCR: “People do not need a language course for selling cigarettes in the streets”. Many disagree with this. There are simply not enough opportunities to work in Bangladesh, and people with a different culture, another language and not enough skills are not able to find jobs anywhere. As even the refugees who were recognized by UNHCR do not have a residence permit, they do not have any legal rights in Bangladesh. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable to police harassment. This often happens, especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

  10. The eventual solution

  SPDC’S INCREASED REPRESSION OF (ROHINGYA) MUSLIMS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

  After September 11, 2001, SPDC intensified its repression against (Rohingya) Muslims. The Burmese military junta accused Rohingya armed groups of getting support of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. It is more than likely that with the actions against Muslims, the SPDC tried to improve its bad name in the United States. The SPDC hoped unsuccessfully that the US Government would appreciate the junta’s ‘anti-terrorism’ stance and therefore loosen its sanctions against the regime. However, none of the Rohingyas working in academic fields and politics, as well as Rakhine-Buddhist representatives, seemed to believe that there are any direct links between the Rohingya armed groups and Al-Qaeda. The armed Rohingya groups do receive financial support from organizations in Arab countries, but this does certainly not mean that there is any evidence about links between these groups and Al-Qaeda. At the other hand, some Rohingya people living in Pakistan for many years already joined the Taliban during its war with the US in late 2001. However, again this does not say anything about any kind of relation between the Rohingya armed groups and Taliban or Al-Qaeda.

  According to the Arakan Historical Society (AHS), there are some 200,000 Rohingyas living in Pakistan already for some time. 500,000 more live in Saudi-Arabia, 300,000 in Bangladesh and 2,4 million in Burma, an AHS representative said.

  NEED FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON SPDC

  The eventual solution for almost all problems of Burmese refugees in Bangladesh is of course a structural political improvement of the situation in Burma: democratization and respect for human rights (including religious rights). Therefore, more political pressure on the Burmese military junta is necessary. In this context, many Burmese organizations and individual refugees stressed the importance of economic pressure such as trade sanctions and a tourism boycott. Some also referred to the importance of keeping the Asian neighbouring countries (including China!) involved and convince them of the need to press the Burmese junta to normalize the political situation for the benefit of all Burmese citizens and the refugees.

  ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR RECONCILIATION IN ARAKAN

  Many Burmese organizations feel that, apart from political and economic pressure on the Burmese regime, there is something else which is necessary. Many Rohingya-Muslim as well as Rakhine-Buddhist organizations mentioned the serious sensitivities between both populations in Arakan. The area has always been exploited by the former and current Burmese military regime. In this light, many refer to the very sad happenings in Arakan in 1942 as the cause of the still continuing distrust between both peoples, “a turning point in Arakan history.” During this hectic period in the Second World War, the British colonial power had to withdraw from Arakan and Burma because of the Japanese army invading Burma. Because of the power vacuum in that period, large-scale communal violence in Arakan broke out, causing tens of thousands of deaths. It seems that some nationalists in the local administration had initiated the communal unrest in a kind of a ‘anti-foreigner hysteria’, trying to move the Muslim Rohingyas out of Arakan.

  Former dictator Ne Wins’ BSPP (Burma Socialist Programme Party) Government, and the successive government of SLORC/SPDC have always continued an anti- (Rohingya-)Muslim policy.

  A few armed groups, Rakhine-Buddhist as well as Rohingya-Mulsims, still fight the SPDC today. They mainly strive for the self-determination of Arakan. There are two Rohingya-armed groups: Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). Both strive for self-determination and recognition of the cultural/religious rights of the Rohingya Muslims in Arakan. ARNO seems to be more secular and strives for democracy, while RSO is a bit more Islamic, but seems to have been moderated in recent years. The Buddhist-Rakhine armed groups are National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) and Arakan Liberation Party (ALP). They both want democracy. ALP strives for self-determination and NUPA is officially in favour of an independent Arakan, although it realises that ‘self-determination’ is most feasible. However, some Buddhist Rakhine and Rohingya Muslims argue that the armed groups only play a minor role nowadays.

  Although there are a few positive developments in the last couple of years, such as the establishment of the Arakan Independence Alliance (AIA) by ARNO and NUPA, the majority of the Rohingya-Muslim and Rakhine-Buddhist peoples still distrust each other. This also results in a continuing cold non-relationship between most Rohingya and Rakhine-Buddhist organizations and armed groups. The move of NUPA, probably the only armed Rakhine-Buddhist organization that de facto recognizes the Rohingyas, in first instance resulted in a huge amount of criticism from the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), ALP and Rakhine Buddhists in general.

  The SPDC is the only party benefiting from the continuing, extremely sensitive relationship between Rohingya-Muslim politicians, armed groups, journalists, intellectuals etc. and their Rakhine-Buddhist counterparts. Some organizations and individuals seem to have been rather narrow-minded until now, and mainly focus on internal differences in Arakan instead of looking at the broader picture of how to cooperate towards national reconciliation and democracy.

  Therefore, serious efforts are necessary in order to support a reconciliation process in Arakan. This is also invaluable when Arakan has to play a role in a future tri-partite dialogue between NLD, ethnic minorities and SPDC. Without an Arakanese reconciliation process, a durable peace in Arakan, even in a future democratic Burma, will be extremely uncertain. New waves of Rohingya refugees to neighbouring countries remain imaginable even when Burma becomes a democracy.

  According to some Rohingya and Buddhist-Rakhine organizations, the international community (including EU and US), the main Burmese opposition parties (especially NLD, NCUB, NCGUB, UNA, ENSCC) and the Arakanese Muslim Rohingyas and Rakhine Buddhists) have to play an active role to achieve reconcilitation in Arakan:

  • The international community should support and wherever possible facilitate an Arakanese reconciliation process;
  • The Burmese democratic opposition and ethnic umbrella organizations should actively support a reconciliation process in Arakan. They need to recognize relevant Rohingya organizations. Formal contacts with these organizations should be increased. The Burmese opposition should not just repeat ‘we will handle this affair after we have achieved democracy’, but should instead play an active moderating and mediating role between all relevant Arakanese groups;
  • All involved Rakhine-Buddhist and Muslim-Rohingya organizations, MPs, intellectuals, armed groups, journalists etc. should play a constructive role and participate in the much-needed reconciliation process. Therefore, it will be necessary that representatives of both Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhiss recognize and respect each other and try to move a step forward. Only repeating the difficulties and sensitivities of the past would not be very constructive.

  An Arakanese reconciliation process will certainly be not easy, many organizations argued. Some even feel that it will be a ‘mission impossible’. But at the same time, the majority seem to understand that Arakanese reconciliation is of great importance for today’s struggle for freedom and human rights, as well as for tomorrow’s peace.

  11. Conclusions

  The core problem of the Rohingya people is still the discriminatory and repressive policy of the Burmese junta (SPDC) in Arakan State. Because of the continuation of forced labour, restrictions on the freedom of movement, discriminatory taxes, confiscation of land etc. Rohingyas continue to flee to Bangladesh. Many refugees nowadays living in Bangladesh refuse to repatriate to Burma voluntarily because of their fear of repression.

  At the same time, Rohingyas are on a constant pressure by the Bangladeshi authorities to repatriate to Burma. This pressure has significantly increased in recent weeks and months. Camp authorities in the two remaining official Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh use different methods to press refugees, who are increasingly threatened by this.

  UNHCR has made plans to stimulate self-sufficiency for these recognized refugees. Although all involved parties accept the relevance of this plan, there are serious concerns about the lack of communication and consultation about this plan by UNHCR. The same concerns are felt by UNHCRs second plan to ‘streamline’ its health care in the camps. There are serious doubts about the time-frame of the plan and the impact of an eventual withdrawing of international organizations (as ‘nightwatchers’) from the camps. There are also concerns about the (lack of) possibilities and maybe even willingness of the Government of Bangladesh (and for example its Ministry of Health) to agree with UNHCRs plans and to actively support it.

  Except of the recognized Rohingya refugees, there are 100,000 – 300,000 undocumented Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. They survive without any rights and are in vulnerable condition. The current policy of the Bangladeshi authorities (and UNHCR) which denies any involvement and humanitarian support is not humane. The Bangladeshi authorities and UNHCR have no sufficient information how many undocumented Rohingyas exactly live in Bangladesh and their reasons for fleeing to Bangladesh. Because these refugees are officially denied any kind of (humanitarian) aid, they often live in unbearable conditions. An extreme example is the newly established Teknaf ‘makeshift camp’, where 4,000 refugees are hiding now, and which will possibly be swept away by the monsoon rains.

  As long as the current political and human rights problems in Burma/Arakan continue, the responsibility of the Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR remains to protect the refugees from Burma and to guarantee them protection and a bearable life. Because the conditions In the camps are deteriorating, there is now for them an even more urgent need to increase their efforts.